https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 11:50:09 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2025-03319 bdu:2025-03319 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2025-03319 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2024-53140 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2024-53140 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2025-avi-0002 certfr-2025-avi-0002 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2025-avi-0002 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-346415 EUVD-2026-346415 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-346415 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2024-53140 <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>netlink: terminate outstanding dump on socket close</p> <p>Netlink supports iterative dumping of data. It provides the families the following ops: - start - (optional) kicks off the dumping process - dump - actual dump helper, keeps getting called until it returns 0 - done - (optional) pairs with .start, can be used for cleanup The whole process is asynchronous and the repeated calls to .dump don&#39;t actually happen in a tight loop, but rather are triggered in response to recvmsg() on the socket.</p> <p>This gives the user full control over the dump, but also means that the user can close the socket without getting to the end of the dump. To make sure .start is always paired with .done we check if there is an ongoing dump before freeing the socket, and if so call .done.</p> <p>The complication is that sockets can get freed from BH and .done is allowed to sleep. So we use a workqueue to defer the call, when needed.</p> <p>Unfortunately this does not work correctly. What we defer is not the cleanup but rather releasing a reference on the socket. We have no guarantee that we own the last reference, if someone else holds the socket they may release it in BH and we&#39;re back to square one.</p> <p>The whole dance, however, appears to be unnecessary. Only the user can interact with dumps, so we can clean up when socket is closed. And close always happens in process context. Some async code may still access the socket after close, queue notifi…</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>netlink: terminate outstanding dump on socket close</p> <p>Netlink supports iterative dumping of data. It provides the families the following ops: - start - (optional) kicks off the dumping process - dump - actual dump helper, keeps getting called until it returns 0 - done - (optional) pairs with .start, can be used for cleanup The whole process is asynchronous and the repeated calls to .dump don&#39;t actually happen in a tight loop, but rather are triggered in response to recvmsg() on the socket.</p> <p>This gives the user full control over the dump, but also means that the user can close the socket without getting to the end of the dump. To make sure .start is always paired with .done we check if there is an ongoing dump before freeing the socket, and if so call .done.</p> <p>The complication is that sockets can get freed from BH and .done is allowed to sleep. So we use a workqueue to defer the call, when needed.</p> <p>Unfortunately this does not work correctly. What we defer is not the cleanup but rather releasing a reference on the socket. We have no guarantee that we own the last reference, if someone else holds the socket they may release it in BH and we&#39;re back to square one.</p> <p>The whole dance, however, appears to be unnecessary. Only the user can interact with dumps, so we can clean up when socket is closed. And close always happens in process context. Some async code may still access the socket after close, queue notifi…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2024-53140 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-pc3w-52r9-h2g7 <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>netlink: terminate outstanding dump on socket close</p> <p>Netlink supports iterative dumping of data. It provides the families the following ops: - start - (optional) kicks off the dumping process - dump - actual dump helper, keeps getting called until it returns 0 - done - (optional) pairs with .start, can be used for cleanup The whole process is asynchronous and the repeated calls to .dump don&#39;t actually happen in a tight loop, but rather are triggered in response to recvmsg() on the socket.</p> <p>This gives the user full control over the dump, but also means that the user can close the socket without getting to the end of the dump. To make sure .start is always paired with .done we check if there is an ongoing dump before freeing the socket, and if so call .done.</p> <p>The complication is that sockets can get freed from BH and .done is allowed to sleep. So we use a workqueue to defer the call, when needed.</p> <p>Unfortunately this does not work correctly. What we defer is not the cleanup but rather releasing a reference on the socket. We have no guarantee that we own the last reference, if someone else holds the socket they may release it in BH and we&#39;re back to square one.</p> <p>The whole dance, however, appears to be unnecessary. Only the user can interact with dumps, so we can clean up when socket is closed. And close always happens in process context. Some async code may still access the socket after close, queue notifi…</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>netlink: terminate outstanding dump on socket close</p> <p>Netlink supports iterative dumping of data. It provides the families the following ops: - start - (optional) kicks off the dumping process - dump - actual dump helper, keeps getting called until it returns 0 - done - (optional) pairs with .start, can be used for cleanup The whole process is asynchronous and the repeated calls to .dump don&#39;t actually happen in a tight loop, but rather are triggered in response to recvmsg() on the socket.</p> <p>This gives the user full control over the dump, but also means that the user can close the socket without getting to the end of the dump. To make sure .start is always paired with .done we check if there is an ongoing dump before freeing the socket, and if so call .done.</p> <p>The complication is that sockets can get freed from BH and .done is allowed to sleep. So we use a workqueue to defer the call, when needed.</p> <p>Unfortunately this does not work correctly. What we defer is not the cleanup but rather releasing a reference on the socket. We have no guarantee that we own the last reference, if someone else holds the socket they may release it in BH and we&#39;re back to square one.</p> <p>The whole dance, however, appears to be unnecessary. Only the user can interact with dumps, so we can clean up when socket is closed. And close always happens in process context. Some async code may still access the socket after close, queue notifi…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-pc3w-52r9-h2g7 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/icsa-23-348-10 <p>expat 2.1.0 and earlier does not properly handle entities expansion unless an application developer uses the XML_SetEntityDeclHandler function, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (resource consumption), send HTTP requests to intranet servers, or read arbitrary files via a crafted XML document, aka an XML External Entity (XXE) issue. NOTE: it could be argued that because expat already provides the ability to disable external entity expansion, the responsibility for resolving this issue lies with application developers; according to this argument, this entry should be REJECTed, and each affected application would need its own CVE. shadow: TOCTOU (time-of-check time-of-use) race condition when copying and removing directory trees run-mailcap in the Debian mime-support package before 3.52-1+deb7u1 allows context-dependent attackers to execute arbitrary commands via shell metacharacters in a filename. In Python (aka CPython) up to 3.10.8, the mailcap module does not add escape characters into commands discovered in the system mailcap file. This may allow attackers to inject shell commands into applications that call mailcap.findmatch with untrusted input (if they lack validation of user-provided filenames or arguments). The fix is also back-ported to 3.7, 3.8, 3.9 Use-after-free vulnerability in bzip2recover in bzip2 1.0.6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via a crafted bzip2 file, related to block ends set to before the start o…</p> <p>expat 2.1.0 and earlier does not properly handle entities expansion unless an application developer uses the XML_SetEntityDeclHandler function, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (resource consumption), send HTTP requests to intranet servers, or read arbitrary files via a crafted XML document, aka an XML External Entity (XXE) issue. NOTE: it could be argued that because expat already provides the ability to disable external entity expansion, the responsibility for resolving this issue lies with application developers; according to this argument, this entry should be REJECTed, and each affected application would need its own CVE. shadow: TOCTOU (time-of-check time-of-use) race condition when copying and removing directory trees run-mailcap in the Debian mime-support package before 3.52-1+deb7u1 allows context-dependent attackers to execute arbitrary commands via shell metacharacters in a filename. In Python (aka CPython) up to 3.10.8, the mailcap module does not add escape characters into commands discovered in the system mailcap file. This may allow attackers to inject shell commands into applications that call mailcap.findmatch with untrusted input (if they lack validation of user-provided filenames or arguments). The fix is also back-ported to 3.7, 3.8, 3.9 Use-after-free vulnerability in bzip2recover in bzip2 1.0.6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via a crafted bzip2 file, related to block ends set to before the start o…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/icsa-23-348-10 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2024-53140 msrc_CVE-2024-53140 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2024-53140 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2025-1034 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> openEuler:20.03-LTS-SP4: kernel</p> <p>The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself. Security Fix(es): In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sh: cpuinfo: Fix a warning for CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK When CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK and CONFIG_DEBUG_PER_CPU_MAPS are selected, cpu_max_bits_warn() generates a runtime warning similar as below when showing /proc/cpuinfo. Fix this by using nr_cpu_ids (the runtime limit) instead of NR_CPUS to iterate CPUs. [ 3.052463] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 3.059679] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1 at include/linux/cpumask.h:108 show_cpuinfo+0x5e8/0x5f0 [ 3.070072] Modules linked in: efivarfs autofs4 [ 3.076257] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 5.19-rc5+ #1052 [ 3.099465] Stack : 9000000100157b08 9000000000f18530 9000000000cf846c 9000000100154000 [ 3.109127] 9000000100157a50 0000000000000000 9000000100157a58 9000000000ef7430 [ 3.118774] 90000001001578e8 0000000000000040 0000000000000020 ffffffffffffffff [ 3.128412] 0000000000aaaaaa 1ab25f00eec96a37 900000010021de80 900000000101c890 [ 3.138056] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000aaaaaa [ 3.147711] ffff8000339dc220 0000000000000001 0000000006ab4000 0000000000000000 [ 3.157364] 900000000101c998 0000000000000004 9000000000ef7430 0000000000000000 [ 3.167012] 0000000000000009 000000000000006c 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 3.176641] 9000000000d3de08 9000000001…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> openEuler:20.03-LTS-SP4: kernel</p> <p>The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself. Security Fix(es): In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sh: cpuinfo: Fix a warning for CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK When CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK and CONFIG_DEBUG_PER_CPU_MAPS are selected, cpu_max_bits_warn() generates a runtime warning similar as below when showing /proc/cpuinfo. Fix this by using nr_cpu_ids (the runtime limit) instead of NR_CPUS to iterate CPUs. [ 3.052463] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 3.059679] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1 at include/linux/cpumask.h:108 show_cpuinfo+0x5e8/0x5f0 [ 3.070072] Modules linked in: efivarfs autofs4 [ 3.076257] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 5.19-rc5+ #1052 [ 3.099465] Stack : 9000000100157b08 9000000000f18530 9000000000cf846c 9000000100154000 [ 3.109127] 9000000100157a50 0000000000000000 9000000100157a58 9000000000ef7430 [ 3.118774] 90000001001578e8 0000000000000040 0000000000000020 ffffffffffffffff [ 3.128412] 0000000000aaaaaa 1ab25f00eec96a37 900000010021de80 900000000101c890 [ 3.138056] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000aaaaaa [ 3.147711] ffff8000339dc220 0000000000000001 0000000006ab4000 0000000000000000 [ 3.157364] 900000000101c998 0000000000000004 9000000000ef7430 0000000000000000 [ 3.167012] 0000000000000009 000000000000006c 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 3.176641] 9000000000d3de08 9000000001…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2025-1034 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2025:01919-1 <p>Security update for the Linux Kernel</p> <p>Security update for the Linux Kernel</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2025:01919-1 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2024-53140 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-kvm and 193 more</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netlink: terminate outstanding dump on socket close Netlink supports iterative dumping of data. It provides the families the following ops: - start - (optional) kicks off the dumping process - dump - actual dump helper, keeps getting called until it returns 0 - done - (optional) pairs with .start, can be used for cleanup The whole process is asynchronous and the repeated calls to .dump don&#39;t actually happen in a tight loop, but rather are triggered in response to recvmsg() on the socket. This gives the user full control over the dump, but also means that the user can close the socket without getting to the end of the dump. To make sure .start is always paired with .done we check if there is an ongoing dump before freeing the socket, and if so call .done. The complication is that sockets can get freed from BH and .done is allowed to sleep. So we use a workqueue to defer the call, when needed. Unfortunately this does not work correctly. What we defer is not the cleanup but rather releasing a reference on the socket. We have no guarantee that we own the last reference, if someone else holds the socket they may release it in BH and we&#39;re back to square one. The whole dance, however, appears to be unnecessary. Only the user can interact with dumps, so we can clean up when socket is closed. And close always happens in process context. Some async code may still access the socket after close, queue notification…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-kvm and 193 more</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netlink: terminate outstanding dump on socket close Netlink supports iterative dumping of data. It provides the families the following ops: - start - (optional) kicks off the dumping process - dump - actual dump helper, keeps getting called until it returns 0 - done - (optional) pairs with .start, can be used for cleanup The whole process is asynchronous and the repeated calls to .dump don&#39;t actually happen in a tight loop, but rather are triggered in response to recvmsg() on the socket. This gives the user full control over the dump, but also means that the user can close the socket without getting to the end of the dump. To make sure .start is always paired with .done we check if there is an ongoing dump before freeing the socket, and if so call .done. The complication is that sockets can get freed from BH and .done is allowed to sleep. So we use a workqueue to defer the call, when needed. Unfortunately this does not work correctly. What we defer is not the cleanup but rather releasing a reference on the socket. We have no guarantee that we own the last reference, if someone else holds the socket they may release it in BH and we&#39;re back to square one. The whole dance, however, appears to be unnecessary. Only the user can interact with dumps, so we can clean up when socket is closed. And close always happens in process context. Some async code may still access the socket after close, queue notification…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2024-53140 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2024-3608 <p>Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen.</p> <p>Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2024-3608