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bdu:2024-10920

BELL-CVE-2024-39488

Affected: Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts

certfr-2024-avi-0613 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian. Elles permettent à un attaquant de provo…

certfr-2024-avi-0613

EUVD-2026-312925

fkie_cve-2024-39488

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

arm64: asm-bug: Add .align 2 to the end of __BUG_ENTRY

When CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, we fail to add necessary padding bytes to bug_table entries, and as a result the last entry in a bug table will be ignored, potentially leading to an unexpected panic(). All prior entries in the table will be handled correctly.

The arm64 ABI requires that struct fields of up to 8 bytes are naturally-aligned, with padding added within a struct such that struct are suitably aligned within arrays.

When CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERPOSE=y, the layout of a bug_entry is:

struct bug_entry { signed int bug_addr_disp; // 4 bytes signed int file_disp; // 4 bytes unsigned short line; // 2 bytes unsigned short flags; // 2 bytes }

... with 12 bytes total, requiring 4-byte alignment.

When CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, the layout of a bug_entry is:

struct bug_entry { signed int bug_addr_disp; // 4 bytes unsigned short flags; // 2 bytes < implicit padding > // 2 bytes }

... with 8 bytes total, with 6 bytes of data and 2 bytes of trailing padding, requiring 4-byte alginment.

When we create a bug_entry in assembly, we align the start of the entry to 4 bytes, which implicitly handles padding for any prior entries. However, we do not align the end of the entry, and so when CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, the final entry lacks the trailing padding bytes.

For the main kernel image this is not a problem as find_b…

GHSA-hqc7-pg97-xcc3

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

arm64: asm-bug: Add .align 2 to the end of __BUG_ENTRY

The arm64 ABI requires that struct fields of up to 8 bytes are naturally-aligned, with padding added within a struct such that struct are suitably aligned within arrays.

When CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERPOSE=y, the layout of a bug_entry is:

struct bug_entry { signed int bug_addr_disp; // 4 bytes signed int file_disp; // 4 bytes unsigned short line; // 2 bytes unsigned short flags; // 2 bytes }

... with 12 bytes total, requiring 4-byte alignment.

When CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, the layout of a bug_entry is:

struct bug_entry { signed int bug_addr_disp; // 4 bytes unsigned short flags; // 2 bytes < implicit padding > // 2 bytes }

... with 8 bytes total, with 6 bytes of data and 2 bytes of trailing padding, requiring 4-byte alginment.

For the main kernel image this is not a problem as find_b…

OESA-2024-1860 — kernel security update

Affected: openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP1: kernel

The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself. Security Fix(es): In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/cma: Ensure rdma_addr_cancel() happens before issuing more requests The FSM can run in a circle allowing rdma_resolve_ip() to be called twice on the same id_priv. While this cannot happen without going through the work, it violates the invariant that the same address resolution background request cannot be active twice. CPU 1 CPU 2 rdma_resolve_addr(): RDMA_CM_IDLE -> RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY rdma_resolve_ip(addr_handler) #1 process_one_req(): for #1 addr_handler(): RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY -> RDMA_CM_ADDR_BOUND mutex_unlock(&id_priv->handler_mutex); [.. handler still running ..] rdma_resolve_addr(): RDMA_CM_ADDR_BOUND -> RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY rdma_resolve_ip(addr_handler) !! two requests are now on the req_list rdma_destroy_id(): destroy_id_handler_unlock(): _destroy_id(): cma_cancel_operation(): rdma_addr_cancel() // process_one_req() self removes it spin_lock_bh(&lock); cancel_delayed_work(&req->work); if (!list_empty(&req->list)) == true ! rdma_addr_cancel() returns after process_on_req #1 is done kfree(id_priv…

RHSA-2024:9315 — Red Hat Security Advisory: kernel security update

kernel: use after free in i2c kernel: bluetooth: BR/EDR Bluetooth Impersonation Attacks (BIAS) kernel: hwmon: (lm90) Prevent integer overflow/underflow in hysteresis calculations kernel: asix: fix uninit-value in asix_mdio_read() kernel: tty: tty_buffer: Fix the softlockup issue in flush_to_ldisc kernel: hwmon: (w83793) Fix NULL pointer dereference by removing unnecessary structure field kernel: hwmon: (w83791d) Fix NULL pointer dereference by removing unnecessary structure field kernel: powerpc/64s: fix program check interrupt emergency stack path kernel: powerpc/64s: Fix unrecoverable MCE calling async handler from NMI kernel: lib/generic-radix-tree.c: Don't overflow in peek() kernel: powerpc/smp: do not decrement idle task preempt count in CPU offline kernel: can: isotp: isotp_sendmsg(): add result check for wait_event_interruptible() kernel: usbnet: sanity check for maxpacket kernel: nvmem: Fix shift-out-of-bound (UBSAN) with byte size cells kernel: aio: fix use-after-free due to missing POLLFREE handling kernel: powerpc/pseries: Fix potential memleak in papr_get_attr() kernel: of: fdt: fix off-by-one error in unflatten_dt_nodes() kernel: thermal/int340x_thermal: handle data_vault when the value is ZERO_SIZE_PTR kernel: vt_ioctl: fix array_index_nospec in vt_setactivate kernel: bpf: Fix crash due to out of bounds access into reg2btf_ids. kernel: lz4: fix LZ4_decompress_safe_partial read out of bound kernel: x86/mce: Work around an erratum on fast string copy instructions…

SUSE-SU-2024:2892-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel

Security update for the Linux Kernel

UBUNTU-CVE-2024-39488

Affected: Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3 and 140 more

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: asm-bug: Add .align 2 to the end of __BUG_ENTRY When CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, we fail to add necessary padding bytes to bug_table entries, and as a result the last entry in a bug table will be ignored, potentially leading to an unexpected panic(). All prior entries in the table will be handled correctly. The arm64 ABI requires that struct fields of up to 8 bytes are naturally-aligned, with padding added within a struct such that struct are suitably aligned within arrays. When CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERPOSE=y, the layout of a bug_entry is: struct bug_entry { signed int bug_addr_disp; // 4 bytes signed int file_disp; // 4 bytes unsigned short line; // 2 bytes unsigned short flags; // 2 bytes } ... with 12 bytes total, requiring 4-byte alignment. When CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, the layout of a bug_entry is: struct bug_entry { signed int bug_addr_disp; // 4 bytes unsigned short flags; // 2 bytes < implicit padding > // 2 bytes } ... with 8 bytes total, with 6 bytes of data and 2 bytes of trailing padding, requiring 4-byte alginment. When we create a bug_entry in assembly, we align the start of the entry to 4 bytes, which implicitly handles padding for any prior entries. However, we do not align the end of the entry, and so when CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, the final entry lacks the trailing padding bytes. For the main kernel image this is not a problem as find_bug() doesn'…

WID-SEC-W-2024-1555 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen nicht spezifizierten Angriff

Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.