https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sun, 04 Oct 2026 00:51:13 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2024-10059 bdu:2024-10059 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2024-10059 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2024-35871 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2024-35871 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2024-avi-0527 certfr-2024-avi-0527 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2024-avi-0527 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-312767 EUVD-2026-312767 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-312767 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2024-35871 <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>riscv: process: Fix kernel gp leakage</p> <p>childregs represents the registers which are active for the new thread in user context. For a kernel thread, childregs-&gt;gp is never used since the kernel gp is not touched by switch_to. For a user mode helper, the gp value can be observed in user space after execve or possibly by other means.</p> <p>[From the email thread]</p> <p>The /* Kernel thread */ comment is somewhat inaccurate in that it is also used for user_mode_helper threads, which exec a user process, e.g. /sbin/init or when /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern is a pipe. Such threads do not have PF_KTHREAD set and are valid targets for ptrace etc. even before they exec.</p> <p>childregs is the *user* context during syscall execution and it is observable from userspace in at least five ways:</p> <p>1. kernel_execve does not currently clear integer registers, so the starting register state for PID 1 and other user processes started by the kernel has sp = user stack, gp = kernel __global_pointer$, all other integer registers zeroed by the memset in the patch comment.</p> <p>This is a bug in its own right, but I&#39;m unwilling to bet that it is the only way to exploit the issue addressed by this patch.</p> <p>2. ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET): you can PTRACE_ATTACH to a user_mode_helper thread before it execs, but ptrace requires SIGSTOP to be delivered which can only happen at user/kernel boundaries.</p> <p>3. /proc/*/task/*/syscall: this is per…</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>riscv: process: Fix kernel gp leakage</p> <p>childregs represents the registers which are active for the new thread in user context. For a kernel thread, childregs-&gt;gp is never used since the kernel gp is not touched by switch_to. For a user mode helper, the gp value can be observed in user space after execve or possibly by other means.</p> <p>[From the email thread]</p> <p>The /* Kernel thread */ comment is somewhat inaccurate in that it is also used for user_mode_helper threads, which exec a user process, e.g. /sbin/init or when /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern is a pipe. Such threads do not have PF_KTHREAD set and are valid targets for ptrace etc. even before they exec.</p> <p>childregs is the *user* context during syscall execution and it is observable from userspace in at least five ways:</p> <p>1. kernel_execve does not currently clear integer registers, so the starting register state for PID 1 and other user processes started by the kernel has sp = user stack, gp = kernel __global_pointer$, all other integer registers zeroed by the memset in the patch comment.</p> <p>This is a bug in its own right, but I&#39;m unwilling to bet that it is the only way to exploit the issue addressed by this patch.</p> <p>2. ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET): you can PTRACE_ATTACH to a user_mode_helper thread before it execs, but ptrace requires SIGSTOP to be delivered which can only happen at user/kernel boundaries.</p> <p>3. /proc/*/task/*/syscall: this is per…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2024-35871 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wjqf-4c62-v6g5 <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>riscv: process: Fix kernel gp leakage</p> <p>childregs represents the registers which are active for the new thread in user context. For a kernel thread, childregs-&gt;gp is never used since the kernel gp is not touched by switch_to. For a user mode helper, the gp value can be observed in user space after execve or possibly by other means.</p> <p>[From the email thread]</p> <p>The /* Kernel thread */ comment is somewhat inaccurate in that it is also used for user_mode_helper threads, which exec a user process, e.g. /sbin/init or when /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern is a pipe. Such threads do not have PF_KTHREAD set and are valid targets for ptrace etc. even before they exec.</p> <p>childregs is the *user* context during syscall execution and it is observable from userspace in at least five ways:</p> <p>1. kernel_execve does not currently clear integer registers, so the starting register state for PID 1 and other user processes started by the kernel has sp = user stack, gp = kernel __global_pointer$, all other integer registers zeroed by the memset in the patch comment.</p> <p>This is a bug in its own right, but I&#39;m unwilling to bet that it is the only way to exploit the issue addressed by this patch.</p> <p>2. ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET): you can PTRACE_ATTACH to a user_mode_helper thread before it execs, but ptrace requires SIGSTOP to be delivered which can only happen at user/kernel boundaries.</p> <p>3. /proc/*/task/*/syscall: this is per…</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>riscv: process: Fix kernel gp leakage</p> <p>childregs represents the registers which are active for the new thread in user context. For a kernel thread, childregs-&gt;gp is never used since the kernel gp is not touched by switch_to. For a user mode helper, the gp value can be observed in user space after execve or possibly by other means.</p> <p>[From the email thread]</p> <p>The /* Kernel thread */ comment is somewhat inaccurate in that it is also used for user_mode_helper threads, which exec a user process, e.g. /sbin/init or when /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern is a pipe. Such threads do not have PF_KTHREAD set and are valid targets for ptrace etc. even before they exec.</p> <p>childregs is the *user* context during syscall execution and it is observable from userspace in at least five ways:</p> <p>1. kernel_execve does not currently clear integer registers, so the starting register state for PID 1 and other user processes started by the kernel has sp = user stack, gp = kernel __global_pointer$, all other integer registers zeroed by the memset in the patch comment.</p> <p>This is a bug in its own right, but I&#39;m unwilling to bet that it is the only way to exploit the issue addressed by this patch.</p> <p>2. ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET): you can PTRACE_ATTACH to a user_mode_helper thread before it execs, but ptrace requires SIGSTOP to be delivered which can only happen at user/kernel boundaries.</p> <p>3. /proc/*/task/*/syscall: this is per…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wjqf-4c62-v6g5 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2024-1707 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP3: kernel</p> <p>The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself. Security Fix(es): In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5e: Fix use-after-free of encap entry in neigh update handler Function mlx5e_rep_neigh_update() wasn&amp;apos;t updated to accommodate rtnl lock removal from TC filter update path and properly handle concurrent encap entry insertion/deletion which can lead to following use-after-free: [23827.464923] ================================================================== [23827.469446] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mlx5e_encap_take+0x72/0x140 [mlx5_core] [23827.470971] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881d132228c by task kworker/u20:6/21635 [23827.472251] [23827.472615] CPU: 9 PID: 21635 Comm: kworker/u20:6 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc3+ #5 [23827.473788] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [23827.475639] Workqueue: mlx5e mlx5e_rep_neigh_update [mlx5_core] [23827.476731] Call Trace: [23827.477260] dump_stack+0xbb/0x107 [23827.477906] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x18/0x140 [23827.478896] ? mlx5e_encap_take+0x72/0x140 [mlx5_core] [23827.479879] ? mlx5e_encap_take+0x72/0x140 [mlx5_core] [23827.480905] kasan_report.cold+0x7c/0xd8 [23827.481701] ? mlx5e_encap_take+0x72/0x140 [mlx5_core] [23827.482744] kasan_check_range+0x145/0x1a0 [23827.493112] mlx5e_encap_take+0x72/0x140 [mlx5_core] [23827.494054] ? mlx5e_tc_tun_encap_info_equal_ge…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP3: kernel</p> <p>The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself. Security Fix(es): In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5e: Fix use-after-free of encap entry in neigh update handler Function mlx5e_rep_neigh_update() wasn&amp;apos;t updated to accommodate rtnl lock removal from TC filter update path and properly handle concurrent encap entry insertion/deletion which can lead to following use-after-free: [23827.464923] ================================================================== [23827.469446] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mlx5e_encap_take+0x72/0x140 [mlx5_core] [23827.470971] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881d132228c by task kworker/u20:6/21635 [23827.472251] [23827.472615] CPU: 9 PID: 21635 Comm: kworker/u20:6 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc3+ #5 [23827.473788] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [23827.475639] Workqueue: mlx5e mlx5e_rep_neigh_update [mlx5_core] [23827.476731] Call Trace: [23827.477260] dump_stack+0xbb/0x107 [23827.477906] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x18/0x140 [23827.478896] ? mlx5e_encap_take+0x72/0x140 [mlx5_core] [23827.479879] ? mlx5e_encap_take+0x72/0x140 [mlx5_core] [23827.480905] kasan_report.cold+0x7c/0xd8 [23827.481701] ? mlx5e_encap_take+0x72/0x140 [mlx5_core] [23827.482744] kasan_check_range+0x145/0x1a0 [23827.493112] mlx5e_encap_take+0x72/0x140 [mlx5_core] [23827.494054] ? mlx5e_tc_tun_encap_info_equal_ge…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2024-1707 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2024-35871 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-oracle, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0 and 170 more</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: process: Fix kernel gp leakage childregs represents the registers which are active for the new thread in user context. For a kernel thread, childregs-&gt;gp is never used since the kernel gp is not touched by switch_to. For a user mode helper, the gp value can be observed in user space after execve or possibly by other means. [From the email thread] The /* Kernel thread */ comment is somewhat inaccurate in that it is also used for user_mode_helper threads, which exec a user process, e.g. /sbin/init or when /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern is a pipe. Such threads do not have PF_KTHREAD set and are valid targets for ptrace etc. even before they exec. childregs is the *user* context during syscall execution and it is observable from userspace in at least five ways: 1. kernel_execve does not currently clear integer registers, so the starting register state for PID 1 and other user processes started by the kernel has sp = user stack, gp = kernel __global_pointer$, all other integer registers zeroed by the memset in the patch comment. This is a bug in its own right, but I&#39;m unwilling to bet that it is the only way to exploit the issue addressed by this patch. 2. ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET): you can PTRACE_ATTACH to a user_mode_helper thread before it execs, but ptrace requires SIGSTOP to be delivered which can only happen at user/kernel boundaries. 3. /proc/*/task/*/syscall: this is perfectly ha…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-oracle, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0 and 170 more</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: process: Fix kernel gp leakage childregs represents the registers which are active for the new thread in user context. For a kernel thread, childregs-&gt;gp is never used since the kernel gp is not touched by switch_to. For a user mode helper, the gp value can be observed in user space after execve or possibly by other means. [From the email thread] The /* Kernel thread */ comment is somewhat inaccurate in that it is also used for user_mode_helper threads, which exec a user process, e.g. /sbin/init or when /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern is a pipe. Such threads do not have PF_KTHREAD set and are valid targets for ptrace etc. even before they exec. childregs is the *user* context during syscall execution and it is observable from userspace in at least five ways: 1. kernel_execve does not currently clear integer registers, so the starting register state for PID 1 and other user processes started by the kernel has sp = user stack, gp = kernel __global_pointer$, all other integer registers zeroed by the memset in the patch comment. This is a bug in its own right, but I&#39;m unwilling to bet that it is the only way to exploit the issue addressed by this patch. 2. ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET): you can PTRACE_ATTACH to a user_mode_helper thread before it execs, but ptrace requires SIGSTOP to be delivered which can only happen at user/kernel boundaries. 3. /proc/*/task/*/syscall: this is perfectly ha…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2024-35871 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2024-1188 <p>Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen.</p> <p>Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2024-1188