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bdu:2024-02838

Withdrawn: BELL-CVE-2024-24576 — CVE-2024-24576 does not affect BellSoft software

Withdrawn by the publisher.

EUVD-2026-259408

fkie_cve-2024-24576

Rust is a programming language. The Rust Security Response WG was notified that the Rust standard library prior to version 1.77.2 did not properly escape arguments when invoking batch files (with the `bat` and `cmd` extensions) on Windows using the `Command`. An attacker able to control the arguments passed to the spawned process could execute arbitrary shell commands by bypassing the escaping. The severity of this vulnerability is critical for those who invoke batch files on Windows with untrusted arguments. No other platform or use is affected.

The `Command::arg` and `Command::args` APIs state in their documentation that the arguments will be passed to the spawned process as-is, regardless of the content of the arguments, and will not be evaluated by a shell. This means it should be safe to pass untrusted input as an argument.

On Windows, the implementation of this is more complex than other platforms, because the Windows API only provides a single string containing all the arguments to the spawned process, and it's up to the spawned process to split them. Most programs use the standard C run-time argv, which in practice results in a mostly consistent way arguments are splitted.

One exception though is `cmd.exe` (used among other things to execute batch files), which has its own argument splitting logic. That forces the standard library to implement custom escaping for arguments passed to batch files. Unfortunately it was reported that our escaping logic was not thoroug…

gsd-2024-24576

HSEC-2024-0003 — process: command injection via argument list on Windows

Affected: Hackage: process

# process: command injection via argument list on Windows

The *process* library on Windows is vulnerable to a command injection vulnerability, via `cmd.exe`'s interpretation of arguments. Programs that invoke batch files (`.bat`, `.cmd`) and pass arguments whose values are affected by program inputs may be affected.

This issue was discovered in many programming languages' Windows process execution behaviour. It was tracked by CERT/CC as **VU#123335** and a coordinated disclosure was made on 2024-04-09 17:00 UTC.

A fix was released in *process-1.6.19.0*.

## Background

Unlike POSIX systems, Windows does not have a mechanism for passing multiple arguments.Command line parsing is up to individual programs.

The *process* library defines the `RawCommand` constructor for specifying an executable and its arguments:

```haskell data CmdSpec = ShellCommand String | RawCommand FilePath [String] ```

On Windows, the `RawCommand` executable name and arguments are serialised into a single *command line* string, with separate arguments quoted separately. *process* then invokes the Windows [`CreateProcess`][doc-CreateProcess] routine with this command line string is given as the `lpCommandLine` argument.

[doc-CreateProcess]: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-createprocessa

## Issue

When executing `.bat` or `.cmd` files, [`CreateProcess`][doc-CreateProcess] implicitly spawns `cmd.exe`. The `System.Process` command lin…

msrc_CVE-2024-24576 — Rusts's `std::process::Command` did not properly escape arguments of batch files on Windows

msrc_CVE-2024-24576

openSUSE-SU-2024:13966-1 — cargo1.77-1.77.2-1.1 on GA media

cargo1.77-1.77.2-1.1 on GA media