https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 11:31:54 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-337132 EUVD-2026-337132 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-337132 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2024-23688 <p>Consensys Discovery versions less than 0.4.5 uses the same AES/GCM nonce for the entire session. which should ideally be unique for every message. The node&#39;s private key isn&#39;t compromised, only the session key generated for specific peer communication is exposed.</p> <p>Consensys Discovery versions less than 0.4.5 uses the same AES/GCM nonce for the entire session. which should ideally be unique for every message. The node&#39;s private key isn&#39;t compromised, only the session key generated for specific peer communication is exposed.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2024-23688 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-w3hj-wr2q-x83g <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Maven: tech.pegasys.discovery:discovery</p> <p>Discovery uses the same AES/GCM Nonce throughout the session though it should be generated on per message basis which can lead to the leaking of the session key. As the actual ENR record is signed with a different key it is not possible for an attacker to alter the ENR record. Note that the node private key is not compromised, only the session key generated to communicate with an individual peer.</p> <p>From [discovery spec](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/f97b8a5b8e9589d3355ebbd9d4a58d5d1644bdf7/discv5/discv5-theory.md#session-cache): &gt; The number of messages which can be encrypted with a certain session key is limited because encryption of each message requires a unique nonce for AES-GCM. In addition to the keys, the session cache must also keep track of the count of outgoing messages to ensure the uniqueness of nonce values. Since the wire protocol uses 96 bit AES-GCM nonces, it is strongly recommended to generate them by encoding the current outgoing message count into the first 32 bits of the nonce and filling the remaining 64 bits with random data generated by a cryptographically secure random number generator.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Maven: tech.pegasys.discovery:discovery</p> <p>Discovery uses the same AES/GCM Nonce throughout the session though it should be generated on per message basis which can lead to the leaking of the session key. As the actual ENR record is signed with a different key it is not possible for an attacker to alter the ENR record. Note that the node private key is not compromised, only the session key generated to communicate with an individual peer.</p> <p>From [discovery spec](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/f97b8a5b8e9589d3355ebbd9d4a58d5d1644bdf7/discv5/discv5-theory.md#session-cache): &gt; The number of messages which can be encrypted with a certain session key is limited because encryption of each message requires a unique nonce for AES-GCM. In addition to the keys, the session cache must also keep track of the count of outgoing messages to ensure the uniqueness of nonce values. Since the wire protocol uses 96 bit AES-GCM nonces, it is strongly recommended to generate them by encoding the current outgoing message count into the first 32 bits of the nonce and filling the remaining 64 bits with random data generated by a cryptographically secure random number generator.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-w3hj-wr2q-x83g https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2024-23688 gsd-2024-23688 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2024-23688