https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 10 Oct 2026 04:41:39 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-10643 EUVD-2026-10643 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-10643 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2023-52137 <p>The [`tj-actions/verify-changed-files`](https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files) action allows for command injection in changed filenames, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code and potentially leak secrets. The [`verify-changed-files`](https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files) workflow returns the list of files changed within a workflow execution. This could potentially allow filenames that contain special characters such as `;` which can be used by an attacker to take over the [GitHub Runner](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-github-hosted-runners/about-github-hosted-runners) if the output value is used in a raw fashion (thus being directly replaced before execution) inside a `run` block. By running custom commands, an attacker may be able to steal secrets such as `GITHUB_TOKEN` if triggered on other events than `pull_request`.</p> <p>This has been patched in versions [17](https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files/releases/tag/v17) and [17.0.0](https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files/releases/tag/v17.0.0) by enabling `safe_output` by default and returning filename paths escaping special characters for bash environments.</p> <p>The [`tj-actions/verify-changed-files`](https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files) action allows for command injection in changed filenames, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code and potentially leak secrets. The [`verify-changed-files`](https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files) workflow returns the list of files changed within a workflow execution. This could potentially allow filenames that contain special characters such as `;` which can be used by an attacker to take over the [GitHub Runner](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-github-hosted-runners/about-github-hosted-runners) if the output value is used in a raw fashion (thus being directly replaced before execution) inside a `run` block. By running custom commands, an attacker may be able to steal secrets such as `GITHUB_TOKEN` if triggered on other events than `pull_request`.</p> <p>This has been patched in versions [17](https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files/releases/tag/v17) and [17.0.0](https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files/releases/tag/v17.0.0) by enabling `safe_output` by default and returning filename paths escaping special characters for bash environments.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2023-52137 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-ghm2-rq8q-wrhc <p><strong>Affected:</strong> GitHub Actions: tj-actions/verify-changed-files</p> <p>### Summary The [`tj-actions/verify-changed-files`](https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files) action allows for command injection in changed filenames, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code and potentially leak secrets.</p> <p>### Details The [`verify-changed-files`](https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files) workflow returns the list of files changed within a workflow execution.</p> <p>This could potentially allow filenames that contain special characters such as `;` and \` (backtick) which can be used by an attacker to take over the [GitHub Runner](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-github-hosted-runners/about-github-hosted-runners) if the output value is used in a raw fashion (thus being directly replaced before execution) inside a `run` block. By running custom commands an attacker may be able to steal **secrets** such as `GITHUB_TOKEN` if triggered on other events than `pull_request`. For example on `push`.</p> <p>#### Proof of Concept</p> <p>1. Submit a pull request to the repository with a new file injecting a command. For example `$(whoami).txt` would be a valid filename. 2. Upon approval of the workflow (triggered by the pull request), the action will get executed and the malicious pull request filename will flow into the `List all changed files tracked and untracked files` step.</p> <p>```yaml - name: List all changed files tracked and untracked files run: | echo &#34;Changed files: ${{ steps.verify-changed-files.outputs.changed_files }}&#34; ```</p> <p>Example output:…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> GitHub Actions: tj-actions/verify-changed-files</p> <p>### Summary The [`tj-actions/verify-changed-files`](https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files) action allows for command injection in changed filenames, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code and potentially leak secrets.</p> <p>### Details The [`verify-changed-files`](https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files) workflow returns the list of files changed within a workflow execution.</p> <p>This could potentially allow filenames that contain special characters such as `;` and \` (backtick) which can be used by an attacker to take over the [GitHub Runner](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-github-hosted-runners/about-github-hosted-runners) if the output value is used in a raw fashion (thus being directly replaced before execution) inside a `run` block. By running custom commands an attacker may be able to steal **secrets** such as `GITHUB_TOKEN` if triggered on other events than `pull_request`. For example on `push`.</p> <p>#### Proof of Concept</p> <p>1. Submit a pull request to the repository with a new file injecting a command. For example `$(whoami).txt` would be a valid filename. 2. Upon approval of the workflow (triggered by the pull request), the action will get executed and the malicious pull request filename will flow into the `List all changed files tracked and untracked files` step.</p> <p>```yaml - name: List all changed files tracked and untracked files run: | echo &#34;Changed files: ${{ steps.verify-changed-files.outputs.changed_files }}&#34; ```</p> <p>Example output:…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-ghm2-rq8q-wrhc https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2023-52137 gsd-2023-52137 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2023-52137