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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-161063</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-161063</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-161063</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-161063</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2023-47122</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2023-47122</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Gitsign is software for keyless Git signing using Sigstore. In versions of gitsign starting with 0.6.0 and prior to 0.8.0, Rekor public keys were fetched via the Rekor API, instead of through the local TUF client. If the upstream Rekor server happened to be compromised, gitsign clients could potentially be tricked into trusting incorrect signatures. There is no known compromise the default public good instance (`rekor.sigstore.dev`) - anyone using this instance is unaffected. This issue was fixed in v0.8.0. No known workarounds are available.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Gitsign is software for keyless Git signing using Sigstore. In versions of gitsign starting with 0.6.0 and prior to 0.8.0, Rekor public keys were fetched via the Rekor API, instead of through the local TUF client. If the upstream Rekor server happened to be compromised, gitsign clients could potentially be tricked into trusting incorrect signatures. There is no known compromise the default public good instance (`rekor.sigstore.dev`) - anyone using this instance is unaffected. This issue was fixed in v0.8.0. No known workarounds are available.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2023-47122</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-xvrc-2wvh-49vc — Gitsign's Rekor public keys fetched from upstream API instead of local TUF client.</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xvrc-2wvh-49vc</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/sigstore/gitsign&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In certain versions of gitsign, Rekor public keys were fetched via the Rekor API, instead of through the local TUF client. If the upstream Rekor server happened to be compromised, gitsign clients could potentially be tricked into trusting incorrect signatures.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is no known compromise the default public good instance (`rekor.sigstore.dev`) - anyone using this instance is unlikely to be affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This was fixed in v0.8.0 via https://github.com/sigstore/gitsign/pull/399&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;n/a&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### References
_Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;https://docs.sigstore.dev/about/threat-model/#sigstore-threat-model&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/sigstore/gitsign&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In certain versions of gitsign, Rekor public keys were fetched via the Rekor API, instead of through the local TUF client. If the upstream Rekor server happened to be compromised, gitsign clients could potentially be tricked into trusting incorrect signatures.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is no known compromise the default public good instance (`rekor.sigstore.dev`) - anyone using this instance is unlikely to be affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This was fixed in v0.8.0 via https://github.com/sigstore/gitsign/pull/399&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;n/a&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### References
_Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;https://docs.sigstore.dev/about/threat-model/#sigstore-threat-model&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xvrc-2wvh-49vc</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>gsd-2023-47122</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2023-47122</link>
      <description>gsd-2023-47122</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2023-47122</guid>
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