https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 05 Oct 2026 03:57:39 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2023-08294 bdu:2023-08294 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2023-08294 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2023-avi-0938 certfr-2023-avi-0938 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2023-avi-0938 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-259891 EUVD-2026-259891 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-259891 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2023-46835 <p>The current setup of the quarantine page tables assumes that the quarantine domain (dom_io) has been initialized with an address width of DEFAULT_DOMAIN_ADDRESS_WIDTH (48) and hence 4 page table levels.</p> <p>However dom_io being a PV domain gets the AMD-Vi IOMMU page tables levels based on the maximum (hot pluggable) RAM address, and hence on systems with no RAM above the 512GB mark only 3 page-table levels are configured in the IOMMU.</p> <p>On systems without RAM above the 512GB boundary amd_iommu_quarantine_init() will setup page tables for the scratch page with 4 levels, while the IOMMU will be configured to use 3 levels only, resulting in the last page table directory (PDE) effectively becoming a page table entry (PTE), and hence a device in quarantine mode gaining write access to the page destined to be a PDE.</p> <p>Due to this page table level mismatch, the sink page the device gets read/write access to is no longer cleared between device assignment, possibly leading to data leaks.</p> <p>The current setup of the quarantine page tables assumes that the quarantine domain (dom_io) has been initialized with an address width of DEFAULT_DOMAIN_ADDRESS_WIDTH (48) and hence 4 page table levels.</p> <p>However dom_io being a PV domain gets the AMD-Vi IOMMU page tables levels based on the maximum (hot pluggable) RAM address, and hence on systems with no RAM above the 512GB mark only 3 page-table levels are configured in the IOMMU.</p> <p>On systems without RAM above the 512GB boundary amd_iommu_quarantine_init() will setup page tables for the scratch page with 4 levels, while the IOMMU will be configured to use 3 levels only, resulting in the last page table directory (PDE) effectively becoming a page table entry (PTE), and hence a device in quarantine mode gaining write access to the page destined to be a PDE.</p> <p>Due to this page table level mismatch, the sink page the device gets read/write access to is no longer cleared between device assignment, possibly leading to data leaks.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2023-46835 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-c2mm-wq7p-rpm8 <p>The current setup of the quarantine page tables assumes that the quarantine domain (dom_io) has been initialized with an address width of DEFAULT_DOMAIN_ADDRESS_WIDTH (48) and hence 4 page table levels.</p> <p>However dom_io being a PV domain gets the AMD-Vi IOMMU page tables levels based on the maximum (hot pluggable) RAM address, and hence on systems with no RAM above the 512GB mark only 3 page-table levels are configured in the IOMMU.</p> <p>On systems without RAM above the 512GB boundary amd_iommu_quarantine_init() will setup page tables for the scratch page with 4 levels, while the IOMMU will be configured to use 3 levels only, resulting in the last page table directory (PDE) effectively becoming a page table entry (PTE), and hence a device in quarantine mode gaining write access to the page destined to be a PDE.</p> <p>Due to this page table level mismatch, the sink page the device gets read/write access to is no longer cleared between device assignment, possibly leading to data leaks.</p> <p>The current setup of the quarantine page tables assumes that the quarantine domain (dom_io) has been initialized with an address width of DEFAULT_DOMAIN_ADDRESS_WIDTH (48) and hence 4 page table levels.</p> <p>However dom_io being a PV domain gets the AMD-Vi IOMMU page tables levels based on the maximum (hot pluggable) RAM address, and hence on systems with no RAM above the 512GB mark only 3 page-table levels are configured in the IOMMU.</p> <p>On systems without RAM above the 512GB boundary amd_iommu_quarantine_init() will setup page tables for the scratch page with 4 levels, while the IOMMU will be configured to use 3 levels only, resulting in the last page table directory (PDE) effectively becoming a page table entry (PTE), and hence a device in quarantine mode gaining write access to the page destined to be a PDE.</p> <p>Due to this page table level mismatch, the sink page the device gets read/write access to is no longer cleared between device assignment, possibly leading to data leaks.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-c2mm-wq7p-rpm8 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2023-46835 gsd-2023-46835 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2023-46835 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2024:13442-1 <p>xen-4.18.0_02-1.1 on GA media</p> <p>xen-4.18.0_02-1.1 on GA media</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2024:13442-1 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2023:4466-1 <p>Security update for xen</p> <p>Security update for xen</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2023:4466-1 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2023-46835 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: xen, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: xen, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: xen, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: xen, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: xen, Ubuntu:25.10: xen, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: xen</p> <p>The current setup of the quarantine page tables assumes that the quarantine domain (dom_io) has been initialized with an address width of DEFAULT_DOMAIN_ADDRESS_WIDTH (48) and hence 4 page table levels. However dom_io being a PV domain gets the AMD-Vi IOMMU page tables levels based on the maximum (hot pluggable) RAM address, and hence on systems with no RAM above the 512GB mark only 3 page-table levels are configured in the IOMMU. On systems without RAM above the 512GB boundary amd_iommu_quarantine_init() will setup page tables for the scratch page with 4 levels, while the IOMMU will be configured to use 3 levels only, resulting in the last page table directory (PDE) effectively becoming a page table entry (PTE), and hence a device in quarantine mode gaining write access to the page destined to be a PDE. Due to this page table level mismatch, the sink page the device gets read/write access to is no longer cleared between device assignment, possibly leading to data leaks.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: xen, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: xen, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: xen, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: xen, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: xen, Ubuntu:25.10: xen, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: xen</p> <p>The current setup of the quarantine page tables assumes that the quarantine domain (dom_io) has been initialized with an address width of DEFAULT_DOMAIN_ADDRESS_WIDTH (48) and hence 4 page table levels. However dom_io being a PV domain gets the AMD-Vi IOMMU page tables levels based on the maximum (hot pluggable) RAM address, and hence on systems with no RAM above the 512GB mark only 3 page-table levels are configured in the IOMMU. On systems without RAM above the 512GB boundary amd_iommu_quarantine_init() will setup page tables for the scratch page with 4 levels, while the IOMMU will be configured to use 3 levels only, resulting in the last page table directory (PDE) effectively becoming a page table entry (PTE), and hence a device in quarantine mode gaining write access to the page destined to be a PDE. Due to this page table level mismatch, the sink page the device gets read/write access to is no longer cleared between device assignment, possibly leading to data leaks.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2023-46835 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2023-2900 <p>Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Xen ausnutzen, um Informationen offenzulegen.</p> <p>Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Xen ausnutzen, um Informationen offenzulegen.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2023-2900