https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sun, 04 Oct 2026 00:56:06 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-9768 EUVD-2026-9768 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-9768 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2023-46254 <p>capsule-proxy is a reverse proxy for Capsule kubernetes multi-tenancy framework. A bug in the RoleBinding reflector used by `capsule-proxy` gives ServiceAccount tenant owners the right to list Namespaces of other tenants backed by the same owner kind and name. For example consider two tenants `solar` and `wind`. Tenant `solar`, owned by a ServiceAccount named `tenant-owner` in the Namespace `solar`. Tenant `wind`, owned by a ServiceAccount named `tenant-owner` in the Namespace `wind`. The Tenant owner `solar` would be able to list the namespaces of the Tenant `wind` and vice-versa, although this is not correct. The bug introduces an exfiltration vulnerability since allows the listing of Namespace resources of other Tenants, although just in some specific conditions: 1. `capsule-proxy` runs with the `--disable-caching=false` (default value: `false`) and 2. Tenant owners are ServiceAccount, with the same resource name, but in different Namespaces. This vulnerability doesn&#39;t allow any privilege escalation on the outer tenant Namespace-scoped resources, since the Kubernetes RBAC is enforcing this. This issue has been addressed in version 0.4.5. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.</p> <p>capsule-proxy is a reverse proxy for Capsule kubernetes multi-tenancy framework. A bug in the RoleBinding reflector used by `capsule-proxy` gives ServiceAccount tenant owners the right to list Namespaces of other tenants backed by the same owner kind and name. For example consider two tenants `solar` and `wind`. Tenant `solar`, owned by a ServiceAccount named `tenant-owner` in the Namespace `solar`. Tenant `wind`, owned by a ServiceAccount named `tenant-owner` in the Namespace `wind`. The Tenant owner `solar` would be able to list the namespaces of the Tenant `wind` and vice-versa, although this is not correct. The bug introduces an exfiltration vulnerability since allows the listing of Namespace resources of other Tenants, although just in some specific conditions: 1. `capsule-proxy` runs with the `--disable-caching=false` (default value: `false`) and 2. Tenant owners are ServiceAccount, with the same resource name, but in different Namespaces. This vulnerability doesn&#39;t allow any privilege escalation on the outer tenant Namespace-scoped resources, since the Kubernetes RBAC is enforcing this. This issue has been addressed in version 0.4.5. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2023-46254 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-6758-979h-249x <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/projectcapsule/capsule, Go: github.com/projectcapsule/capsule-proxy</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>A bug in the RoleBinding reflector used by `capsule-proxy` gives ServiceAccount tenant owners the right to list Namespaces of other tenants backed by the same owner kind and name.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>- Tenant `solar`, owned by a ServiceAccount named `tenant-owner` in the Namespace `solar` - Tenant `wind`, owned by a ServiceAccount named `tenant-owner` in the Namespace `wind`</p> <p>&gt; Please, notice the same ServiceAccount name, although in different namespaces.</p> <p>The Tenant owner `solar` would be able to list the namespaces of the Tenant `wind` and vice-versa, although this is not correct.</p> <p>The bug introduces an exfiltration vulnerability since allows the listing of Namespace resources of other Tenants, although just in some specific conditions:</p> <p>1. `capsule-proxy` runs with the `--disable-caching=false` (default value: `false`) 2. Tenant owners are ServiceAccount, with the same resource name, but in different Namespaces.</p> <p>The CVE doesn&#39;t allow any privilege escalation on the outer tenant Namespace-scoped resources, since the Kubernetes RBAC is enforcing this.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/projectcapsule/capsule, Go: github.com/projectcapsule/capsule-proxy</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>A bug in the RoleBinding reflector used by `capsule-proxy` gives ServiceAccount tenant owners the right to list Namespaces of other tenants backed by the same owner kind and name.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>- Tenant `solar`, owned by a ServiceAccount named `tenant-owner` in the Namespace `solar` - Tenant `wind`, owned by a ServiceAccount named `tenant-owner` in the Namespace `wind`</p> <p>&gt; Please, notice the same ServiceAccount name, although in different namespaces.</p> <p>The Tenant owner `solar` would be able to list the namespaces of the Tenant `wind` and vice-versa, although this is not correct.</p> <p>The bug introduces an exfiltration vulnerability since allows the listing of Namespace resources of other Tenants, although just in some specific conditions:</p> <p>1. `capsule-proxy` runs with the `--disable-caching=false` (default value: `false`) 2. Tenant owners are ServiceAccount, with the same resource name, but in different Namespaces.</p> <p>The CVE doesn&#39;t allow any privilege escalation on the outer tenant Namespace-scoped resources, since the Kubernetes RBAC is enforcing this.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-6758-979h-249x https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2023-46254 gsd-2023-46254 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2023-46254