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EUVD-2026-245066

fkie_cve-2023-42811

aes-gcm is a pure Rust implementation of the AES-GCM. Starting in version 0.10.0 and prior to version 0.10.3, in the AES GCM implementation of decrypt_in_place_detached, the decrypted ciphertext (i.e. the correct plaintext) is exposed even if tag verification fails. If a program using the `aes-gcm` crate's `decrypt_in_place*` APIs accesses the buffer after decryption failure, it will contain a decryption of an unauthenticated input. Depending on the specific nature of the program this may enable Chosen Ciphertext Attacks (CCAs) which can cause a catastrophic breakage of the cipher including full plaintext recovery. Version 0.10.3 contains a fix for this issue.

GHSA-423w-p2w9-r7vq — AEADs/aes-gcm: Plaintext exposed in decrypt_in_place_detached even on tag verification failure

Affected: crates.io: aes-gcm

### Summary In the AES GCM implementation of decrypt_in_place_detached, the decrypted ciphertext (i.e. the correct plaintext) is exposed even if tag verification fails.

### Impact If a program using the `aes-gcm` crate's `decrypt_in_place*` APIs accesses the buffer after decryption failure, it will contain a decryption of an unauthenticated input. Depending on the specific nature of the program this may enable Chosen Ciphertext Attacks (CCAs) which can cause a catastrophic breakage of the cipher including full plaintext recovery.

### Details As seen in the implementation of [decrypt_in_place_detached](https://docs.rs/aes-gcm/latest/src/aes_gcm/lib.rs.html#309) for AES GCM, if the tag verification fails, an error is returned. Because the decryption of the ciphertext is done in place, the plaintext contents are now exposed via `buffer`.

This should ideally not be the case - as noted in page 17 of[ NIST's publication _Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC_](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38d.pdf): _In Step 8, the result of Step 7 is compared with the authentication tag that was received as an input: if they are identical, then the plaintext is returned; otherwise,FAIL is returned._

This is seems correctly addressed in the [AES GCM SIV implementation](https://docs.rs/aes-gcm-siv/latest/src/aes_gcm_siv/lib.rs.html#307), where the decrypted buffer is encrypted again before the error is r…

gsd-2023-42811

openSUSE-SU-2024:13315-1 — shadowsocks-rust-1.16.2-1.1 on GA media

shadowsocks-rust-1.16.2-1.1 on GA media

RUSTSEC-2023-0096 — Plaintext exposed in decrypt_in_place_detached even on tag verification failure

Affected: crates.io: aes-gcm

## Summary

In the AES GCM implementation of decrypt_in_place_detached, the decrypted ciphertext (i.e. the correct plaintext) is exposed even if tag verification fails.

## Impact

If a program using the aes-gcm crate's decrypt_in_place* APIs accesses the buffer after decryption failure, it will contain a decryption of an unauthenticated input. Depending on the specific nature of the program this may enable Chosen Ciphertext Attacks (CCAs) which can cause a catastrophic breakage of the cipher including full plaintext recovery.

## Details

As seen in the implementation of decrypt_in_place_detached for AES GCM, if the tag verification fails, an error is returned. Because the decryption of the ciphertext is done in place, the plaintext contents are now exposed via buffer.

This should ideally not be the case - as noted in page 17 of NIST's publication Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC:

In Step 8, the result of Step 7 is compared with the authentication tag that was received as an input: if they are identical, then the plaintext is returned; otherwise,FAIL is returned.

This is seems correctly addressed in the AES GCM SIV implementation, where the decrypted buffer is encrypted again before the error is returned - this fix is straightforward to implement in AES GCM. To ensure that these types of cases are covered during testing, it would be valuable to add test cases like 23, 24 etc from project wycheproof to ensure that when…

SUSE-SU-2023:4060-1 — Security update for rage-encryption

Security update for rage-encryption