<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 13:25:25 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-199755</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-199755</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-199755</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-199755</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2023-36474</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2023-36474</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Interactsh is an open-source tool for detecting out-of-band interactions. Domains configured with interactsh server prior to version 1.0.0 were vulnerable to subdomain takeover for a specific subdomain, i.e `app.` Interactsh server used to create cname entries for `app` pointing to `projectdiscovery.github.io` as default, which intended to used for hosting interactsh web client using GitHub pages. This is a security issue with a self-hosted interactsh server in which the user may not have configured a web client but still have a CNAME entry pointing to GitHub pages, making them vulnerable to subdomain takeover. This allows a threat actor to host / run arbitrary client side code (cross-site scripting) in a user&amp;#39;s browser when browsing the vulnerable subdomain. Version 1.0.0 fixes this issue by making CNAME optional, rather than default.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Interactsh is an open-source tool for detecting out-of-band interactions. Domains configured with interactsh server prior to version 1.0.0 were vulnerable to subdomain takeover for a specific subdomain, i.e `app.` Interactsh server used to create cname entries for `app` pointing to `projectdiscovery.github.io` as default, which intended to used for hosting interactsh web client using GitHub pages. This is a security issue with a self-hosted interactsh server in which the user may not have configured a web client but still have a CNAME entry pointing to GitHub pages, making them vulnerable to subdomain takeover. This allows a threat actor to host / run arbitrary client side code (cross-site scripting) in a user&amp;#39;s browser when browsing the vulnerable subdomain. Version 1.0.0 fixes this issue by making CNAME optional, rather than default.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2023-36474</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-m36x-mgfh-8g78 — Subdomain Takeover in Interactsh server</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-m36x-mgfh-8g78</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/projectdiscovery/interactsh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A domain configured with interactsh server was vulnerable to subdomain takeover for specfic subdomain, i.e `app`, Interactsh server before `&amp;lt; 1.0.0` used to create cname entries for `app` pointing to `projectdiscovery.github.io` as default which intended to used for hosting interactsh [web client](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/interactsh-web) using GitHub pages. It turns out to be a security issue with a self-hosted interactsh server in which the user may not have configured a web client but still have a cname entry pointing to GitHub pages, making them vulnerable to subdomain takeover.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue was initially reported to us as a subdomain takeover for one of our domains that runs interactsh server by **Melih** at `security@projectdiscovery.io`, and after conducting an internal investigation, we determined that it was an issue with the default config of interactsh server affecting all the server running self-hosted instance of interactsh, as a result - cname entry has been removed in the latest release.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### Impact
This allows one to host / run arbitrary client side code (XSS) in a user&amp;#39;s browser when browsing the vulnerable subdomain, for more details on the impact, please read this [detailed blogpost](https://labs.detectify.com/2014/10/21/hostile-subdomain-takeover-using-herokugithubdesk-more/) from Detectify.
#### Patches
Update to [Interactsh server v1.0.0 ](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/interactsh/releases/tag/v1.0.0)with `go install -v github.com/project…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/projectdiscovery/interactsh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A domain configured with interactsh server was vulnerable to subdomain takeover for specfic subdomain, i.e `app`, Interactsh server before `&amp;lt; 1.0.0` used to create cname entries for `app` pointing to `projectdiscovery.github.io` as default which intended to used for hosting interactsh [web client](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/interactsh-web) using GitHub pages. It turns out to be a security issue with a self-hosted interactsh server in which the user may not have configured a web client but still have a cname entry pointing to GitHub pages, making them vulnerable to subdomain takeover.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue was initially reported to us as a subdomain takeover for one of our domains that runs interactsh server by **Melih** at `security@projectdiscovery.io`, and after conducting an internal investigation, we determined that it was an issue with the default config of interactsh server affecting all the server running self-hosted instance of interactsh, as a result - cname entry has been removed in the latest release.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### Impact
This allows one to host / run arbitrary client side code (XSS) in a user&amp;#39;s browser when browsing the vulnerable subdomain, for more details on the impact, please read this [detailed blogpost](https://labs.detectify.com/2014/10/21/hostile-subdomain-takeover-using-herokugithubdesk-more/) from Detectify.
#### Patches
Update to [Interactsh server v1.0.0 ](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/interactsh/releases/tag/v1.0.0)with `go install -v github.com/project…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-m36x-mgfh-8g78</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>gsd-2023-36474</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2023-36474</link>
      <description>gsd-2023-36474</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2023-36474</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
