https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Thu, 15 Oct 2026 19:25:58 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1233 certfr-2026-avi-1233 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1233 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-8229 EUVD-2026-8229 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-8229 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2023-26158 <p>All versions of the package mockjs are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the Util.extend function due to missing check if the attribute resolves to the object prototype. By adding or modifying attributes of an object prototype, it is possible to create attributes that exist on every object, or replace critical attributes with malicious ones. This can be problematic if the software depends on existence or non-existence of certain attributes, or uses pre-defined attributes of object prototype (such as hasOwnProperty, toString or valueOf). User controlled inputs inside the extend() method of the Mock.Handler, Mock.Random, Mock.RE.Handler or Mock.Util, will allow an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. Workaround By using a denylist of dangerous attributes, this weakness can be eliminated. Add the following line in the Util.extend function: js js if ([&#34;__proto__&#34;, &#34;constructor&#34;, &#34;prototype&#34;].includes(name)) continue js // src/mock/handler.js Util.extend = function extend() { var target = arguments[0] || {}, i = 1, length = arguments.length, options, name, src, copy, clone if (length === 1) { target = this i = 0 } for (; i &lt; length; i++) { options = arguments[i] if (!options) continue for (name in options) { if ([&#34;__proto__&#34;, &#34;constructor&#34;, &#34;prototype&#34;].includes(name)) continue src = target[name]…</p> <p>All versions of the package mockjs are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the Util.extend function due to missing check if the attribute resolves to the object prototype. By adding or modifying attributes of an object prototype, it is possible to create attributes that exist on every object, or replace critical attributes with malicious ones. This can be problematic if the software depends on existence or non-existence of certain attributes, or uses pre-defined attributes of object prototype (such as hasOwnProperty, toString or valueOf). User controlled inputs inside the extend() method of the Mock.Handler, Mock.Random, Mock.RE.Handler or Mock.Util, will allow an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. Workaround By using a denylist of dangerous attributes, this weakness can be eliminated. Add the following line in the Util.extend function: js js if ([&#34;__proto__&#34;, &#34;constructor&#34;, &#34;prototype&#34;].includes(name)) continue js // src/mock/handler.js Util.extend = function extend() { var target = arguments[0] || {}, i = 1, length = arguments.length, options, name, src, copy, clone if (length === 1) { target = this i = 0 } for (; i &lt; length; i++) { options = arguments[i] if (!options) continue for (name in options) { if ([&#34;__proto__&#34;, &#34;constructor&#34;, &#34;prototype&#34;].includes(name)) continue src = target[name]…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2023-26158 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mh8j-9jvh-gjf6 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: mockjs</p> <p>All versions of the package mockjs are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the Util.extend function due to missing check if the attribute resolves to the object prototype. By adding or modifying attributes of an object prototype, it is possible to create attributes that exist on every object, or replace critical attributes with malicious ones. This can be problematic if the software depends on existence or non-existence of certain attributes, or uses pre-defined attributes of object prototype (such as hasOwnProperty, toString or valueOf).</p> <p>User controlled inputs inside the extend() method of the Mock.Handler, Mock.Random, Mock.RE.Handler or Mock.Util, will allow an attacker to exploit this vulnerability.</p> <p>Workaround</p> <p>By using a denylist of dangerous attributes, this weakness can be eliminated.</p> <p>Add the following line in the Util.extend function:</p> <p>js js if ([&#34;__proto__&#34;, &#34;constructor&#34;, &#34;prototype&#34;].includes(name)) continue</p> <p>js // src/mock/handler.js Util.extend = function extend() { var target = arguments[0] || {}, i = 1, length = arguments.length, options, name, src, copy, clone</p> <p>if (length === 1) { target = this i = 0 }</p> <p>for (; i &lt; length; i++) { options = arguments[i] if (!options) continue</p> <p>for (name in options) { if ([&#34;__proto__&#34;, &#34;constructor&#34;, &#34;prototype&#34;].includes(name)) continue src = target[name]…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: mockjs</p> <p>All versions of the package mockjs are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the Util.extend function due to missing check if the attribute resolves to the object prototype. By adding or modifying attributes of an object prototype, it is possible to create attributes that exist on every object, or replace critical attributes with malicious ones. This can be problematic if the software depends on existence or non-existence of certain attributes, or uses pre-defined attributes of object prototype (such as hasOwnProperty, toString or valueOf).</p> <p>User controlled inputs inside the extend() method of the Mock.Handler, Mock.Random, Mock.RE.Handler or Mock.Util, will allow an attacker to exploit this vulnerability.</p> <p>Workaround</p> <p>By using a denylist of dangerous attributes, this weakness can be eliminated.</p> <p>Add the following line in the Util.extend function:</p> <p>js js if ([&#34;__proto__&#34;, &#34;constructor&#34;, &#34;prototype&#34;].includes(name)) continue</p> <p>js // src/mock/handler.js Util.extend = function extend() { var target = arguments[0] || {}, i = 1, length = arguments.length, options, name, src, copy, clone</p> <p>if (length === 1) { target = this i = 0 }</p> <p>for (; i &lt; length; i++) { options = arguments[i] if (!options) continue</p> <p>for (name in options) { if ([&#34;__proto__&#34;, &#34;constructor&#34;, &#34;prototype&#34;].includes(name)) continue src = target[name]…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mh8j-9jvh-gjf6 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2023-26158 gsd-2023-26158 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2023-26158