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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>EUVD-2026-221618</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-221618</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-221618</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-221618</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2023-23940</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2023-23940</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;OpenZeppelin Contracts for Cairo is a library for secure smart contract development written in Cairo for StarkNet, a decentralized ZK Rollup. `is_valid_eth_signature` is missing a call to `finalize_keccak` after calling `verify_eth_signature`. As a result, any contract using `is_valid_eth_signature` from the account library (such as the `EthAccount` preset) is vulnerable to a malicious sequencer. Specifically, the malicious sequencer would be able to bypass signature validation to impersonate an instance of these accounts. The issue has been patched in 0.6.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;OpenZeppelin Contracts for Cairo is a library for secure smart contract development written in Cairo for StarkNet, a decentralized ZK Rollup. `is_valid_eth_signature` is missing a call to `finalize_keccak` after calling `verify_eth_signature`. As a result, any contract using `is_valid_eth_signature` from the account library (such as the `EthAccount` preset) is vulnerable to a malicious sequencer. Specifically, the malicious sequencer would be able to bypass signature validation to impersonate an instance of these accounts. The issue has been patched in 0.6.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2023-23940</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-626q-v9j4-mcp4 — OpenZeppelin Contracts contains Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-626q-v9j4-mcp4</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: openzeppelin-cairo-contracts&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Cause
`is_valid_eth_signature` is missing a call to `finalize_keccak` after calling `verify_eth_signature`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
As a result, any contract using `is_valid_eth_signature` from the account library (such as the `EthAccount` preset) is vulnerable to a malicious sequencer. Specifically, the malicious sequencer would be able to bypass signature validation to impersonate an instance of these accounts.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Risk
In order to exploit this vulnerability, it is required to control a sequencer or prover since they&amp;#39;re the ones executing the hints, being able to inject incorrect keccak results.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Today StarkWare is the only party running both a prover or a sequencer, greatly reducing the risk of exploit.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches
The issue has been patched in 0.6.1.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
* Open an issue in [the Contracts for Cairo repository](https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/cairo-contracts/issues/new/choose)
* Email us at [security@openzeppelin.com](mailto:security@openzeppelin.com)&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: openzeppelin-cairo-contracts&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Cause
`is_valid_eth_signature` is missing a call to `finalize_keccak` after calling `verify_eth_signature`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
As a result, any contract using `is_valid_eth_signature` from the account library (such as the `EthAccount` preset) is vulnerable to a malicious sequencer. Specifically, the malicious sequencer would be able to bypass signature validation to impersonate an instance of these accounts.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Risk
In order to exploit this vulnerability, it is required to control a sequencer or prover since they&amp;#39;re the ones executing the hints, being able to inject incorrect keccak results.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Today StarkWare is the only party running both a prover or a sequencer, greatly reducing the risk of exploit.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches
The issue has been patched in 0.6.1.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
* Open an issue in [the Contracts for Cairo repository](https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/cairo-contracts/issues/new/choose)
* Email us at [security@openzeppelin.com](mailto:security@openzeppelin.com)&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-626q-v9j4-mcp4</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>gsd-2023-23940</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2023-23940</link>
      <description>gsd-2023-23940</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2023-23940</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2023-39</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2023-39</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: openzeppelin-cairo-contracts&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenZeppelin Contracts for Cairo is a library for secure smart contract development written in Cairo for StarkNet, a decentralized ZK Rollup. `is_valid_eth_signature` is missing a call to `finalize_keccak` after calling `verify_eth_signature`. As a result, any contract using `is_valid_eth_signature` from the account library (such as the `EthAccount` preset) is vulnerable to a malicious sequencer. Specifically, the malicious sequencer would be able to bypass signature validation to impersonate an instance of these accounts. The issue has been patched in 0.6.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: openzeppelin-cairo-contracts&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenZeppelin Contracts for Cairo is a library for secure smart contract development written in Cairo for StarkNet, a decentralized ZK Rollup. `is_valid_eth_signature` is missing a call to `finalize_keccak` after calling `verify_eth_signature`. As a result, any contract using `is_valid_eth_signature` from the account library (such as the `EthAccount` preset) is vulnerable to a malicious sequencer. Specifically, the malicious sequencer would be able to bypass signature validation to impersonate an instance of these accounts. The issue has been patched in 0.6.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2023-39</guid>
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