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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 02:25:36 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>bdu:2026-03129</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-03129</link>
      <description>bdu:2026-03129</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-03129</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-310994</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-310994</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-310994</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-310994</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2022-50069</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2022-50069</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BPF: Fix potential bad pointer dereference in bpf_sys_bpf()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bpf_sys_bpf() helper function allows an eBPF program to load another
eBPF program from within the kernel. In this case the argument union
bpf_attr pointer (as well as the insns and license pointers inside) is a
kernel address instead of a userspace address (which is the case of a
usual bpf() syscall). To make the memory copying process in the syscall
work in both cases, bpfptr_t was introduced to wrap around the pointer
and distinguish its origin. Specifically, when copying memory contents
from a bpfptr_t, a copy_from_user() is performed in case of a userspace
address and a memcpy() is performed for a kernel address.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This can lead to problems because the in-kernel pointer is never checked
for validity. The problem happens when an eBPF syscall program tries to
call bpf_sys_bpf() to load a program but provides a bad insns pointer --
say 0xdeadbeef -- in the bpf_attr union. The helper calls __sys_bpf()
which would then call bpf_prog_load() to load the program.
bpf_prog_load() is responsible for copying the eBPF instructions to the
newly allocated memory for the program; it creates a kernel bpfptr_t for
insns and invokes copy_from_bpfptr(). Internally, all bpfptr_t
operations are backed by the corresponding sockptr_t operations, which
performs direct memcpy() on kernel pointers for copy_from/strncpy_from
operations. Therefore, the code is always…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BPF: Fix potential bad pointer dereference in bpf_sys_bpf()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bpf_sys_bpf() helper function allows an eBPF program to load another
eBPF program from within the kernel. In this case the argument union
bpf_attr pointer (as well as the insns and license pointers inside) is a
kernel address instead of a userspace address (which is the case of a
usual bpf() syscall). To make the memory copying process in the syscall
work in both cases, bpfptr_t was introduced to wrap around the pointer
and distinguish its origin. Specifically, when copying memory contents
from a bpfptr_t, a copy_from_user() is performed in case of a userspace
address and a memcpy() is performed for a kernel address.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This can lead to problems because the in-kernel pointer is never checked
for validity. The problem happens when an eBPF syscall program tries to
call bpf_sys_bpf() to load a program but provides a bad insns pointer --
say 0xdeadbeef -- in the bpf_attr union. The helper calls __sys_bpf()
which would then call bpf_prog_load() to load the program.
bpf_prog_load() is responsible for copying the eBPF instructions to the
newly allocated memory for the program; it creates a kernel bpfptr_t for
insns and invokes copy_from_bpfptr(). Internally, all bpfptr_t
operations are backed by the corresponding sockptr_t operations, which
performs direct memcpy() on kernel pointers for copy_from/strncpy_from
operations. Therefore, the code is always…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2022-50069</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-737f-4c7f-cgc8</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-737f-4c7f-cgc8</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BPF: Fix potential bad pointer dereference in bpf_sys_bpf()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bpf_sys_bpf() helper function allows an eBPF program to load another
eBPF program from within the kernel. In this case the argument union
bpf_attr pointer (as well as the insns and license pointers inside) is a
kernel address instead of a userspace address (which is the case of a
usual bpf() syscall). To make the memory copying process in the syscall
work in both cases, bpfptr_t was introduced to wrap around the pointer
and distinguish its origin. Specifically, when copying memory contents
from a bpfptr_t, a copy_from_user() is performed in case of a userspace
address and a memcpy() is performed for a kernel address.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This can lead to problems because the in-kernel pointer is never checked
for validity. The problem happens when an eBPF syscall program tries to
call bpf_sys_bpf() to load a program but provides a bad insns pointer --
say 0xdeadbeef -- in the bpf_attr union. The helper calls __sys_bpf()
which would then call bpf_prog_load() to load the program.
bpf_prog_load() is responsible for copying the eBPF instructions to the
newly allocated memory for the program; it creates a kernel bpfptr_t for
insns and invokes copy_from_bpfptr(). Internally, all bpfptr_t
operations are backed by the corresponding sockptr_t operations, which
performs direct memcpy() on kernel pointers for copy_from/strncpy_from
operations. Therefore, the code is always…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BPF: Fix potential bad pointer dereference in bpf_sys_bpf()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bpf_sys_bpf() helper function allows an eBPF program to load another
eBPF program from within the kernel. In this case the argument union
bpf_attr pointer (as well as the insns and license pointers inside) is a
kernel address instead of a userspace address (which is the case of a
usual bpf() syscall). To make the memory copying process in the syscall
work in both cases, bpfptr_t was introduced to wrap around the pointer
and distinguish its origin. Specifically, when copying memory contents
from a bpfptr_t, a copy_from_user() is performed in case of a userspace
address and a memcpy() is performed for a kernel address.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This can lead to problems because the in-kernel pointer is never checked
for validity. The problem happens when an eBPF syscall program tries to
call bpf_sys_bpf() to load a program but provides a bad insns pointer --
say 0xdeadbeef -- in the bpf_attr union. The helper calls __sys_bpf()
which would then call bpf_prog_load() to load the program.
bpf_prog_load() is responsible for copying the eBPF instructions to the
newly allocated memory for the program; it creates a kernel bpfptr_t for
insns and invokes copy_from_bpfptr(). Internally, all bpfptr_t
operations are backed by the corresponding sockptr_t operations, which
performs direct memcpy() on kernel pointers for copy_from/strncpy_from
operations. Therefore, the code is always…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-737f-4c7f-cgc8</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RHSA-2022:7683 — Red Hat Security Advisory: kernel security, bug fix, and enhancement update</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2022:7683</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel: off-path attacker may inject data or terminate victim&amp;#39;s TCP session kernel: race condition in VT_RESIZEX ioctl when vc_cons[i].d is already NULL leading to NULL pointer dereference kernel: use-after-free vulnerability in function sco_sock_sendmsg() kernel: memory leak for large arguments in video_usercopy function in drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ioctl.c kernel: veth: ensure skb entering GRO are not cloned. kernel: inet: fully convert sk-&amp;gt;sk_rx_dst to RCU rules kernel: NFSD: Fix READDIR buffer overflow kernel: cpufreq: CPPC: Fix potential memleak in cppc_cpufreq_cpu_init kernel: nvme-rdma: destroy cm id before destroy qp to avoid use after free kernel: regmap: Fix possible double-free in regcache_rbtree_exit() kernel: ethtool: do not perform operations on net devices being unregistered kernel: scsi: scsi_debug: Fix type in min_t to avoid stack OOB kernel: KVM: x86/mmu: Zap _all_ roots when unmapping gfn range in TDP MMU kernel: udmabuf: validate ubuf-&amp;gt;pagecount kernel: drm/virtio: Ensure that objs is not NULL in virtio_gpu_array_put_free() kernel: smb2_ioctl_query_info NULL pointer dereference kernel: NULL pointer dereference in udf_expand_file_adinicbdue() during writeback kernel: swiotlb information leak with DMA_FROM_DEVICE kernel: uninitialized registers on stack in nft_do_chain can cause kernel pointer leakage to UM kernel: race condition in snd_pcm_hw_free leading to use-after-free kernel: use-after-free in tc_new_tfilter() in net/sched/cls_api.c kernel: KVM: cm…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel: off-path attacker may inject data or terminate victim&amp;#39;s TCP session kernel: race condition in VT_RESIZEX ioctl when vc_cons[i].d is already NULL leading to NULL pointer dereference kernel: use-after-free vulnerability in function sco_sock_sendmsg() kernel: memory leak for large arguments in video_usercopy function in drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ioctl.c kernel: veth: ensure skb entering GRO are not cloned. kernel: inet: fully convert sk-&amp;gt;sk_rx_dst to RCU rules kernel: NFSD: Fix READDIR buffer overflow kernel: cpufreq: CPPC: Fix potential memleak in cppc_cpufreq_cpu_init kernel: nvme-rdma: destroy cm id before destroy qp to avoid use after free kernel: regmap: Fix possible double-free in regcache_rbtree_exit() kernel: ethtool: do not perform operations on net devices being unregistered kernel: scsi: scsi_debug: Fix type in min_t to avoid stack OOB kernel: KVM: x86/mmu: Zap _all_ roots when unmapping gfn range in TDP MMU kernel: udmabuf: validate ubuf-&amp;gt;pagecount kernel: drm/virtio: Ensure that objs is not NULL in virtio_gpu_array_put_free() kernel: smb2_ioctl_query_info NULL pointer dereference kernel: NULL pointer dereference in udf_expand_file_adinicbdue() during writeback kernel: swiotlb information leak with DMA_FROM_DEVICE kernel: uninitialized registers on stack in nft_do_chain can cause kernel pointer leakage to UM kernel: race condition in snd_pcm_hw_free leading to use-after-free kernel: use-after-free in tc_new_tfilter() in net/sched/cls_api.c kernel: KVM: cm…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2022:7683</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2022-50069</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2022-50069</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 94 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: BPF: Fix potential bad pointer dereference in bpf_sys_bpf() The bpf_sys_bpf() helper function allows an eBPF program to load another eBPF program from within the kernel. In this case the argument union bpf_attr pointer (as well as the insns and license pointers inside) is a kernel address instead of a userspace address (which is the case of a usual bpf() syscall). To make the memory copying process in the syscall work in both cases, bpfptr_t was introduced to wrap around the pointer and distinguish its origin. Specifically, when copying memory contents from a bpfptr_t, a copy_from_user() is performed in case of a userspace address and a memcpy() is performed for a kernel address. This can lead to problems because the in-kernel pointer is never checked for validity. The problem happens when an eBPF syscall program tries to call bpf_sys_bpf() to load a program but provides a bad insns pointer -- say 0xdeadbeef -- in the bpf_attr union. The helper calls __sys_bpf() which would then call bpf_prog_load() to load the program. bpf_prog_load() is responsible for copying the eBPF instructions to the newly allocated memory for the program; it creates a kernel bpfptr_t for insns and invokes copy_from_bpfptr(). Internally, all bpfptr_t operations are backed by the corresponding sockptr_t operations, which performs direct memcpy() on kernel pointers for copy_from/strncpy_from operations. Therefore, the code is always hap…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 94 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: BPF: Fix potential bad pointer dereference in bpf_sys_bpf() The bpf_sys_bpf() helper function allows an eBPF program to load another eBPF program from within the kernel. In this case the argument union bpf_attr pointer (as well as the insns and license pointers inside) is a kernel address instead of a userspace address (which is the case of a usual bpf() syscall). To make the memory copying process in the syscall work in both cases, bpfptr_t was introduced to wrap around the pointer and distinguish its origin. Specifically, when copying memory contents from a bpfptr_t, a copy_from_user() is performed in case of a userspace address and a memcpy() is performed for a kernel address. This can lead to problems because the in-kernel pointer is never checked for validity. The problem happens when an eBPF syscall program tries to call bpf_sys_bpf() to load a program but provides a bad insns pointer -- say 0xdeadbeef -- in the bpf_attr union. The helper calls __sys_bpf() which would then call bpf_prog_load() to load the program. bpf_prog_load() is responsible for copying the eBPF instructions to the newly allocated memory for the program; it creates a kernel bpfptr_t for insns and invokes copy_from_bpfptr(). Internally, all bpfptr_t operations are backed by the corresponding sockptr_t operations, which performs direct memcpy() on kernel pointers for copy_from/strncpy_from operations. Therefore, the code is always hap…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2022-50069</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2025-1350 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen Denial of Service</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2025-1350</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2025-1350</guid>
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