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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>bdu:2026-15231</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-15231</link>
      <description>bdu:2026-15231</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-15231</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>certfr-2023-avi-0248 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans &lt;span
class="textit"&gt;Xen&lt;/span&gt;. Elles permettent à un attaquant d…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2023-avi-0248</link>
      <description>certfr-2023-avi-0248</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2023-avi-0248</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-216059</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-216059</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-216059</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-216059</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2022-42332</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2022-42332</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;x86 shadow plus log-dirty mode use-after-free In environments where host assisted address translation is necessary but Hardware Assisted Paging (HAP) is unavailable, Xen will run guests in so called shadow mode. Shadow mode maintains a pool of memory used for both shadow page tables as well as auxiliary data structures. To migrate or snapshot guests, Xen additionally runs them in so called log-dirty mode. The data structures needed by the log-dirty tracking are part of aformentioned auxiliary data. In order to keep error handling efforts within reasonable bounds, for operations which may require memory allocations shadow mode logic ensures up front that enough memory is available for the worst case requirements. Unfortunately, while page table memory is properly accounted for on the code path requiring the potential establishing of new shadows, demands by the log-dirty infrastructure were not taken into consideration. As a result, just established shadow page tables could be freed again immediately, while other code is still accessing them on the assumption that they would remain allocated.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;x86 shadow plus log-dirty mode use-after-free In environments where host assisted address translation is necessary but Hardware Assisted Paging (HAP) is unavailable, Xen will run guests in so called shadow mode. Shadow mode maintains a pool of memory used for both shadow page tables as well as auxiliary data structures. To migrate or snapshot guests, Xen additionally runs them in so called log-dirty mode. The data structures needed by the log-dirty tracking are part of aformentioned auxiliary data. In order to keep error handling efforts within reasonable bounds, for operations which may require memory allocations shadow mode logic ensures up front that enough memory is available for the worst case requirements. Unfortunately, while page table memory is properly accounted for on the code path requiring the potential establishing of new shadows, demands by the log-dirty infrastructure were not taken into consideration. As a result, just established shadow page tables could be freed again immediately, while other code is still accessing them on the assumption that they would remain allocated.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2022-42332</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-jg93-x3r7-r8pf</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jg93-x3r7-r8pf</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;x86 shadow plus log-dirty mode use-after-free In environments where host assisted address translation is necessary but Hardware Assisted Paging (HAP) is unavailable, Xen will run guests in so called shadow mode. Shadow mode maintains a pool of memory used for both shadow page tables as well as auxiliary data structures. To migrate or snapshot guests, Xen additionally runs them in so called log-dirty mode. The data structures needed by the log-dirty tracking are part of aformentioned auxiliary data. In order to keep error handling efforts within reasonable bounds, for operations which may require memory allocations shadow mode logic ensures up front that enough memory is available for the worst case requirements. Unfortunately, while page table memory is properly accounted for on the code path requiring the potential establishing of new shadows, demands by the log-dirty infrastructure were not taken into consideration. As a result, just established shadow page tables could be freed again immediately, while other code is still accessing them on the assumption that they would remain allocated.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;x86 shadow plus log-dirty mode use-after-free In environments where host assisted address translation is necessary but Hardware Assisted Paging (HAP) is unavailable, Xen will run guests in so called shadow mode. Shadow mode maintains a pool of memory used for both shadow page tables as well as auxiliary data structures. To migrate or snapshot guests, Xen additionally runs them in so called log-dirty mode. The data structures needed by the log-dirty tracking are part of aformentioned auxiliary data. In order to keep error handling efforts within reasonable bounds, for operations which may require memory allocations shadow mode logic ensures up front that enough memory is available for the worst case requirements. Unfortunately, while page table memory is properly accounted for on the code path requiring the potential establishing of new shadows, demands by the log-dirty infrastructure were not taken into consideration. As a result, just established shadow page tables could be freed again immediately, while other code is still accessing them on the assumption that they would remain allocated.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jg93-x3r7-r8pf</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>gsd-2022-42332</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2022-42332</link>
      <description>gsd-2022-42332</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2022-42332</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2024:12833-1 — xen-4.17.0_06-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2024:12833-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;xen-4.17.0_06-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;xen-4.17.0_06-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2024:12833-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SUSE-SU-2023:0845-1 — Security update for xen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2023:0845-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for xen&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for xen&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2023:0845-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2022-42332</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2022-42332</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: xen, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: xen, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: xen, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: xen, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: xen, Ubuntu:25.10: xen, Ubuntu:26.10: xen, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: xen&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;x86 shadow plus log-dirty mode use-after-free In environments where host assisted address translation is necessary but Hardware Assisted Paging (HAP) is unavailable, Xen will run guests in so called shadow mode. Shadow mode maintains a pool of memory used for both shadow page tables as well as auxiliary data structures. To migrate or snapshot guests, Xen additionally runs them in so called log-dirty mode. The data structures needed by the log-dirty tracking are part of aformentioned auxiliary data. In order to keep error handling efforts within reasonable bounds, for operations which may require memory allocations shadow mode logic ensures up front that enough memory is available for the worst case requirements. Unfortunately, while page table memory is properly accounted for on the code path requiring the potential establishing of new shadows, demands by the log-dirty infrastructure were not taken into consideration. As a result, just established shadow page tables could be freed again immediately, while other code is still accessing them on the assumption that they would remain allocated.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: xen, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: xen, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: xen, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: xen, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: xen, Ubuntu:25.10: xen, Ubuntu:26.10: xen, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: xen&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;x86 shadow plus log-dirty mode use-after-free In environments where host assisted address translation is necessary but Hardware Assisted Paging (HAP) is unavailable, Xen will run guests in so called shadow mode. Shadow mode maintains a pool of memory used for both shadow page tables as well as auxiliary data structures. To migrate or snapshot guests, Xen additionally runs them in so called log-dirty mode. The data structures needed by the log-dirty tracking are part of aformentioned auxiliary data. In order to keep error handling efforts within reasonable bounds, for operations which may require memory allocations shadow mode logic ensures up front that enough memory is available for the worst case requirements. Unfortunately, while page table memory is properly accounted for on the code path requiring the potential establishing of new shadows, demands by the log-dirty infrastructure were not taken into consideration. As a result, just established shadow page tables could be freed again immediately, while other code is still accessing them on the assumption that they would remain allocated.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2022-42332</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2023-0703 — Xen: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2023-0703</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein entfernter, authentisierter Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Xen ausnutzen, um seine Privilegien zu erhöhen, einen Denial of Service zu verursachen oder Informationen offenzulegen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein entfernter, authentisierter Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Xen ausnutzen, um seine Privilegien zu erhöhen, einen Denial of Service zu verursachen oder Informationen offenzulegen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2023-0703</guid>
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