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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 02:19:30 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>bdu:2022-06147</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2022-06147</link>
      <description>bdu:2022-06147</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2022-06147</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-233556</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-233556</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-233556</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-233556</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2022-39263</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2022-39263</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;`@next-auth/upstash-redis-adapter` is the Upstash Redis adapter for NextAuth.js, which provides authentication for Next.js. Applications that use `next-auth` Email Provider and `@next-auth/upstash-redis-adapter` before v3.0.2 are affected by this vulnerability. The Upstash Redis adapter implementation did not check for both the identifier (email) and the token, but only checking for the identifier when verifying the token in the email callback flow. An attacker who knows about the victim&amp;#39;s email could easily sign in as the victim, given the attacker also knows about the verification token&amp;#39;s expired duration. The vulnerability is patched in v3.0.2. A workaround is available. Using Advanced Initialization, developers can check the requests and compare the query&amp;#39;s token and identifier before proceeding.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;`@next-auth/upstash-redis-adapter` is the Upstash Redis adapter for NextAuth.js, which provides authentication for Next.js. Applications that use `next-auth` Email Provider and `@next-auth/upstash-redis-adapter` before v3.0.2 are affected by this vulnerability. The Upstash Redis adapter implementation did not check for both the identifier (email) and the token, but only checking for the identifier when verifying the token in the email callback flow. An attacker who knows about the victim&amp;#39;s email could easily sign in as the victim, given the attacker also knows about the verification token&amp;#39;s expired duration. The vulnerability is patched in v3.0.2. A workaround is available. Using Advanced Initialization, developers can check the requests and compare the query&amp;#39;s token and identifier before proceeding.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2022-39263</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-4rxr-27mm-mxq9 — Upstash Adapter missing token verification</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4rxr-27mm-mxq9</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @next-auth/upstash-redis-adapter&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
Applications that use `next-auth` Email Provider and `@next-auth/upstash-redis-adapter` before v3.0.2 are affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Description
The Upstash Redis adapter implementation did not check for both the identifier (email) and the token, but only checking for the identifier when verifying the token in the email callback flow. An attacker who knows about the victim&amp;#39;s email could easily sign in as the victim, given the attacker also knows about the verification token&amp;#39;s expired duration.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches
The vulnerability is patched in v3.0.2.
To upgrade, run one of the following:
```
npm i @next-auth/upstash-redis-adapter@latest
```
```
yarn add @next-auth/upstash-redis-adapter@latest
```
```
pnpm add @next-auth/upstash-redis-adapter@latest
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds
Using Advanced Initialization, developers can check the requests and compare the query&amp;#39;s token and identifier before proceeding. Below is an example of how to do this: (Upgrading is still strongly recommended)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
import { createHash } from &amp;#34;crypto&amp;#34;
export default async function auth(req, res) {
  if (req.method === &amp;#34;POST&amp;#34; &amp;amp;&amp;amp; req.action === &amp;#34;callback&amp;#34;) {
    const token = req.query?.token
    const identifier = req.query?.email
    function hashToken(token: string) {
      const provider = authOptions.providers.find((p) =&amp;gt; p.id === &amp;#34;email&amp;#34;)
      const secret = authOptions.secret
      return (
        createHash(&amp;#34;sha256&amp;#34;)
          // Prefer provider specific secret, but use default secret if none specified…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @next-auth/upstash-redis-adapter&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
Applications that use `next-auth` Email Provider and `@next-auth/upstash-redis-adapter` before v3.0.2 are affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Description
The Upstash Redis adapter implementation did not check for both the identifier (email) and the token, but only checking for the identifier when verifying the token in the email callback flow. An attacker who knows about the victim&amp;#39;s email could easily sign in as the victim, given the attacker also knows about the verification token&amp;#39;s expired duration.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches
The vulnerability is patched in v3.0.2.
To upgrade, run one of the following:
```
npm i @next-auth/upstash-redis-adapter@latest
```
```
yarn add @next-auth/upstash-redis-adapter@latest
```
```
pnpm add @next-auth/upstash-redis-adapter@latest
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds
Using Advanced Initialization, developers can check the requests and compare the query&amp;#39;s token and identifier before proceeding. Below is an example of how to do this: (Upgrading is still strongly recommended)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
import { createHash } from &amp;#34;crypto&amp;#34;
export default async function auth(req, res) {
  if (req.method === &amp;#34;POST&amp;#34; &amp;amp;&amp;amp; req.action === &amp;#34;callback&amp;#34;) {
    const token = req.query?.token
    const identifier = req.query?.email
    function hashToken(token: string) {
      const provider = authOptions.providers.find((p) =&amp;gt; p.id === &amp;#34;email&amp;#34;)
      const secret = authOptions.secret
      return (
        createHash(&amp;#34;sha256&amp;#34;)
          // Prefer provider specific secret, but use default secret if none specified…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4rxr-27mm-mxq9</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>gsd-2022-39263</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2022-39263</link>
      <description>gsd-2022-39263</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2022-39263</guid>
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