https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sun, 04 Oct 2026 18:21:48 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-242389 EUVD-2026-242389 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-242389 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2022-31021 <p>Ursa is a cryptographic library for use with blockchains. A weakness in the Hyperledger AnonCreds specification that is not mitigated in the Ursa and AnonCreds implementations is that the Issuer does not publish a key correctness proof demonstrating that a generated private key is sufficient to meet the unlinkability guarantees of AnonCreds. The Ursa and AnonCreds CL-Signatures implementations always generate a sufficient private key. A malicious issuer could in theory create a custom CL Signature implementation (derived from the Ursa or AnonCreds CL-Signatures implementations) that uses weakened private keys such that presentations from holders could be shared by verifiers to the issuer who could determine the holder to which the credential was issued. This vulnerability could impact holders of AnonCreds credentials implemented using the CL-signature scheme in the Ursa and AnonCreds implementations of CL Signatures. The ursa project has has moved to end-of-life status and no fix is expected.</p> <p>Ursa is a cryptographic library for use with blockchains. A weakness in the Hyperledger AnonCreds specification that is not mitigated in the Ursa and AnonCreds implementations is that the Issuer does not publish a key correctness proof demonstrating that a generated private key is sufficient to meet the unlinkability guarantees of AnonCreds. The Ursa and AnonCreds CL-Signatures implementations always generate a sufficient private key. A malicious issuer could in theory create a custom CL Signature implementation (derived from the Ursa or AnonCreds CL-Signatures implementations) that uses weakened private keys such that presentations from holders could be shared by verifiers to the issuer who could determine the holder to which the credential was issued. This vulnerability could impact holders of AnonCreds credentials implemented using the CL-signature scheme in the Ursa and AnonCreds implementations of CL Signatures. The ursa project has has moved to end-of-life status and no fix is expected.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2022-31021 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-2q6j-gqc4-4gw3 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: anoncreds-clsignatures, crates.io: ursa</p> <p># CL Signatures Issuer Key Correctness Proof lacks of prime strength checking</p> <p>A weakness in the Hyperledger AnonCreds specification that is not mitigated in the Ursa and AnonCreds implementations is that the Issuer does not publish a key correctness proof demonstrating that a generated private key is sufficient to meet the unlinkability guarantees of AnonCreds. A sufficient private key is one in which it&#39;s components `p` and `q` are safe primes, such that:</p> <p>- `p` and `q` are both prime numbers - `p` and `q` are not equal - `p` and `q` have the same, sufficiently large, size - For example, using two values both 1024 bits long is sufficient, whereas using one value 2040 bits long and the other 8 bits long is not.</p> <p>The Ursa and AnonCreds CL-Signatures implementations always generate a sufficient private key. A malicious issuer could in theory create a custom CL Signature implementation (derived from the Ursa or AnonCreds CL-Signatures implementations) that uses weakened private keys such that presentations from holders could be shared by verifiers to the issuer who could determine the holder to which the credential was issued.</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>This vulnerability could impact holders of AnonCreds credentials implemented using the CL-signature scheme in the Ursa and AnonCreds implementations of CL Signatures.</p> <p>### Mitigations</p> <p>[Jan Camenisch and Markus Michels. Proving in zero-knowledge that a number is the product of two safe primes] (pages 12-13) demonstrates a key correctness…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: anoncreds-clsignatures, crates.io: ursa</p> <p># CL Signatures Issuer Key Correctness Proof lacks of prime strength checking</p> <p>A weakness in the Hyperledger AnonCreds specification that is not mitigated in the Ursa and AnonCreds implementations is that the Issuer does not publish a key correctness proof demonstrating that a generated private key is sufficient to meet the unlinkability guarantees of AnonCreds. A sufficient private key is one in which it&#39;s components `p` and `q` are safe primes, such that:</p> <p>- `p` and `q` are both prime numbers - `p` and `q` are not equal - `p` and `q` have the same, sufficiently large, size - For example, using two values both 1024 bits long is sufficient, whereas using one value 2040 bits long and the other 8 bits long is not.</p> <p>The Ursa and AnonCreds CL-Signatures implementations always generate a sufficient private key. A malicious issuer could in theory create a custom CL Signature implementation (derived from the Ursa or AnonCreds CL-Signatures implementations) that uses weakened private keys such that presentations from holders could be shared by verifiers to the issuer who could determine the holder to which the credential was issued.</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>This vulnerability could impact holders of AnonCreds credentials implemented using the CL-signature scheme in the Ursa and AnonCreds implementations of CL Signatures.</p> <p>### Mitigations</p> <p>[Jan Camenisch and Markus Michels. Proving in zero-knowledge that a number is the product of two safe primes] (pages 12-13) demonstrates a key correctness…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-2q6j-gqc4-4gw3 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2022-31021 gsd-2022-31021 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2022-31021