https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 15:02:24 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-234389 EUVD-2026-234389 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-234389 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2022-24738 <p>Evmos is the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) Hub on the Cosmos Network. In versions of evmos prior to 2.0.1 attackers are able to drain unclaimed funds from user addresses. To do this an attacker must create a new chain which does not enforce signature verification and connects it to the target evmos instance. The attacker can use this joined chain to transfer unclaimed funds. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this issue.</p> <p>Evmos is the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) Hub on the Cosmos Network. In versions of evmos prior to 2.0.1 attackers are able to drain unclaimed funds from user addresses. To do this an attacker must create a new chain which does not enforce signature verification and connects it to the target evmos instance. The attacker can use this joined chain to transfer unclaimed funds. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this issue.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2022-24738 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5jgq-x857-p8xw <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/tharsis/evmos</p> <p>## Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_</p> <p>### Classification</p> <p>The vulnerability has been classified as `critical` with a score of `9.0` (highest). It has the potential to affect and drain unclaimed airdrop funds from Cosmos and Osmosis eligible user addresses.</p> <p>### Disclosure</p> <p>The attack requires advanced knowledge of the internals of the core and application packages of IBC, IBC relayers, the Cosmos SDK `AnteHandler`, and the Evmos `x/claims` module. The step-by-step attack is described below:</p> <p>1. An actor creates a malicious chain with a custom `AnteHandler` that skips signature verification for transactions, specifically IBC `MsgTransfer`. This allows the attacker to impersonate any account by setting a custom `sender` address field of the IBC transfer message. 2. The malicious actor then connects this newly created chain via IBC to Evmos and fills the `recipient` address from the transfer message with an address they control. 3. Once the IBC packet containing the Transfer data is relayed to Evmos, it is processed by the claims module IBC middleware. Which migrates the claim records to the recipient address, which is owned by the attacker. 4. The attacker then performs two airdrop Actions, claiming up to 75% of the total initial claimable amount. 5. The Actor repeats steps 1., 2., and 3. for every address that has unclaimed funds from the airdrop. This automatically claims 75% of the unclaimable amount. 6. The malicious actor performs the final Act…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/tharsis/evmos</p> <p>## Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_</p> <p>### Classification</p> <p>The vulnerability has been classified as `critical` with a score of `9.0` (highest). It has the potential to affect and drain unclaimed airdrop funds from Cosmos and Osmosis eligible user addresses.</p> <p>### Disclosure</p> <p>The attack requires advanced knowledge of the internals of the core and application packages of IBC, IBC relayers, the Cosmos SDK `AnteHandler`, and the Evmos `x/claims` module. The step-by-step attack is described below:</p> <p>1. An actor creates a malicious chain with a custom `AnteHandler` that skips signature verification for transactions, specifically IBC `MsgTransfer`. This allows the attacker to impersonate any account by setting a custom `sender` address field of the IBC transfer message. 2. The malicious actor then connects this newly created chain via IBC to Evmos and fills the `recipient` address from the transfer message with an address they control. 3. Once the IBC packet containing the Transfer data is relayed to Evmos, it is processed by the claims module IBC middleware. Which migrates the claim records to the recipient address, which is owned by the attacker. 4. The attacker then performs two airdrop Actions, claiming up to 75% of the total initial claimable amount. 5. The Actor repeats steps 1., 2., and 3. for every address that has unclaimed funds from the airdrop. This automatically claims 75% of the unclaimable amount. 6. The malicious actor performs the final Act…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5jgq-x857-p8xw https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2022-24738 gsd-2022-24738 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2022-24738