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    <item>
      <title>BIT-envoy-2022-21657 — X.509 Extended Key Usage and Trust Purposes bypass in Envoy</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bit-envoy-2022-21657</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Bitnami: envoy&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Envoy is an open source edge and service proxy, designed for cloud-native applications. In affected versions Envoy does not restrict the set of certificates it accepts from the peer, either as a TLS client or a TLS server, to only those certificates that contain the necessary extendedKeyUsage (id-kp-serverAuth and id-kp-clientAuth, respectively). This means that a peer may present an e-mail certificate (e.g. id-kp-emailProtection), either as a leaf certificate or as a CA in the chain, and it will be accepted for TLS. This is particularly bad when combined with the issue described in pull request #630, in that it allows a Web PKI CA that is intended only for use with S/MIME, and thus exempted from audit or supervision, to issue TLS certificates that will be accepted by Envoy. As a result Envoy will trust upstream certificates that should not be trusted. There are no known workarounds to this issue. Users are advised to upgrade.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Bitnami: envoy&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Envoy is an open source edge and service proxy, designed for cloud-native applications. In affected versions Envoy does not restrict the set of certificates it accepts from the peer, either as a TLS client or a TLS server, to only those certificates that contain the necessary extendedKeyUsage (id-kp-serverAuth and id-kp-clientAuth, respectively). This means that a peer may present an e-mail certificate (e.g. id-kp-emailProtection), either as a leaf certificate or as a CA in the chain, and it will be accepted for TLS. This is particularly bad when combined with the issue described in pull request #630, in that it allows a Web PKI CA that is intended only for use with S/MIME, and thus exempted from audit or supervision, to issue TLS certificates that will be accepted by Envoy. As a result Envoy will trust upstream certificates that should not be trusted. There are no known workarounds to this issue. Users are advised to upgrade.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bit-envoy-2022-21657</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>cnvd-2022-16289</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cnvd-2022-16289</link>
      <description>cnvd-2022-16289</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cnvd-2022-16289</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-234413</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-234413</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-234413</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-234413</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2022-21657</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2022-21657</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Envoy is an open source edge and service proxy, designed for cloud-native applications. In affected versions Envoy does not restrict the set of certificates it accepts from the peer, either as a TLS client or a TLS server, to only those certificates that contain the necessary extendedKeyUsage (id-kp-serverAuth and id-kp-clientAuth, respectively). This means that a peer may present an e-mail certificate (e.g. id-kp-emailProtection), either as a leaf certificate or as a CA in the chain, and it will be accepted for TLS. This is particularly bad when combined with the issue described in pull request #630, in that it allows a Web PKI CA that is intended only for use with S/MIME, and thus exempted from audit or supervision, to issue TLS certificates that will be accepted by Envoy. As a result Envoy will trust upstream certificates that should not be trusted. There are no known workarounds to this issue. Users are advised to upgrade.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Envoy is an open source edge and service proxy, designed for cloud-native applications. In affected versions Envoy does not restrict the set of certificates it accepts from the peer, either as a TLS client or a TLS server, to only those certificates that contain the necessary extendedKeyUsage (id-kp-serverAuth and id-kp-clientAuth, respectively). This means that a peer may present an e-mail certificate (e.g. id-kp-emailProtection), either as a leaf certificate or as a CA in the chain, and it will be accepted for TLS. This is particularly bad when combined with the issue described in pull request #630, in that it allows a Web PKI CA that is intended only for use with S/MIME, and thus exempted from audit or supervision, to issue TLS certificates that will be accepted by Envoy. As a result Envoy will trust upstream certificates that should not be trusted. There are no known workarounds to this issue. Users are advised to upgrade.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2022-21657</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>gsd-2022-21657</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2022-21657</link>
      <description>gsd-2022-21657</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2022-21657</guid>
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