https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 04:31:22 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bit-contour-2021-32783 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Bitnami: contour</p> <p>Contour is a Kubernetes ingress controller using Envoy proxy. In Contour before version 1.17.1 a specially crafted ExternalName type Service may be used to access Envoy&#39;s admin interface, which Contour normally prevents from access outside the Envoy container. This can be used to shut down Envoy remotely (a denial of service), or to expose the existence of any Secret that Envoy is using for its configuration, including most notably TLS Keypairs. However, it *cannot* be used to get the *content* of those secrets. Since this attack allows access to the administration interface, a variety of administration options are available, such as shutting down the Envoy or draining traffic. In general, the Envoy admin interface cannot easily be used for making changes to the cluster, in-flight requests, or backend services, but it could be used to shut down or drain Envoy, change traffic routing, or to retrieve secret metadata, as mentioned above. The issue will be addressed in Contour v1.18.0 and a cherry-picked patch release, v1.17.1, has been released to cover users who cannot upgrade at this time. For more details refer to the linked GitHub Security Advisory.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Bitnami: contour</p> <p>Contour is a Kubernetes ingress controller using Envoy proxy. In Contour before version 1.17.1 a specially crafted ExternalName type Service may be used to access Envoy&#39;s admin interface, which Contour normally prevents from access outside the Envoy container. This can be used to shut down Envoy remotely (a denial of service), or to expose the existence of any Secret that Envoy is using for its configuration, including most notably TLS Keypairs. However, it *cannot* be used to get the *content* of those secrets. Since this attack allows access to the administration interface, a variety of administration options are available, such as shutting down the Envoy or draining traffic. In general, the Envoy admin interface cannot easily be used for making changes to the cluster, in-flight requests, or backend services, but it could be used to shut down or drain Envoy, change traffic routing, or to retrieve secret metadata, as mentioned above. The issue will be addressed in Contour v1.18.0 and a cherry-picked patch release, v1.17.1, has been released to cover users who cannot upgrade at this time. For more details refer to the linked GitHub Security Advisory.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bit-contour-2021-32783 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-28119 EUVD-2026-28119 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-28119 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2021-32783 <p>Contour is a Kubernetes ingress controller using Envoy proxy. In Contour before version 1.17.1 a specially crafted ExternalName type Service may be used to access Envoy&#39;s admin interface, which Contour normally prevents from access outside the Envoy container. This can be used to shut down Envoy remotely (a denial of service), or to expose the existence of any Secret that Envoy is using for its configuration, including most notably TLS Keypairs. However, it *cannot* be used to get the *content* of those secrets. Since this attack allows access to the administration interface, a variety of administration options are available, such as shutting down the Envoy or draining traffic. In general, the Envoy admin interface cannot easily be used for making changes to the cluster, in-flight requests, or backend services, but it could be used to shut down or drain Envoy, change traffic routing, or to retrieve secret metadata, as mentioned above. The issue will be addressed in Contour v1.18.0 and a cherry-picked patch release, v1.17.1, has been released to cover users who cannot upgrade at this time. For more details refer to the linked GitHub Security Advisory.</p> <p>Contour is a Kubernetes ingress controller using Envoy proxy. In Contour before version 1.17.1 a specially crafted ExternalName type Service may be used to access Envoy&#39;s admin interface, which Contour normally prevents from access outside the Envoy container. This can be used to shut down Envoy remotely (a denial of service), or to expose the existence of any Secret that Envoy is using for its configuration, including most notably TLS Keypairs. However, it *cannot* be used to get the *content* of those secrets. Since this attack allows access to the administration interface, a variety of administration options are available, such as shutting down the Envoy or draining traffic. In general, the Envoy admin interface cannot easily be used for making changes to the cluster, in-flight requests, or backend services, but it could be used to shut down or drain Envoy, change traffic routing, or to retrieve secret metadata, as mentioned above. The issue will be addressed in Contour v1.18.0 and a cherry-picked patch release, v1.17.1, has been released to cover users who cannot upgrade at this time. For more details refer to the linked GitHub Security Advisory.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2021-32783 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5ph6-qq5x-7jwc <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/projectcontour/contour</p> <p>### Impact Josh Ferrell (@josh-ferrell) from VMware has reported that a specially crafted ExternalName type Service may be used to access Envoy&#39;s admin interface, which Contour normally prevents from access outside the Envoy container. This can be used to shut down Envoy remotely (a denial of service), or to expose the existence of any Secret that Envoy is using for its configuration, including most notably TLS Keypairs. However, it *cannot* be used to get the *content* of those secrets.</p> <p>Since this attack allows access to the administration interface, a variety of administration options are available, such as shutting down the Envoy or draining traffic. In general, the Envoy admin interface cannot easily be used for making changes to the cluster, in-flight requests, or backend services, but it could be used to shut down or drain Envoy, change traffic routing, or to retrieve secret metadata, as mentioned above.</p> <p>### Patches The issue will be addressed in the forthcoming Contour v1.18.0 and a patch release, v1.17.1, has been released in the meantime.</p> <p>It is addressed in two ways: - disabling ExternalName type Services by default - When ExternalName Services are enabled, block obvious &#34;localhost&#34; entries.</p> <p>#### Disable ExternalName type Services by default</p> <p>This change prohibits processing of ExternalName services unless the cluster operator specifically allows them using the new `--enable-externalname` flag or equivalent configuration file setting. This is a breaking change f…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/projectcontour/contour</p> <p>### Impact Josh Ferrell (@josh-ferrell) from VMware has reported that a specially crafted ExternalName type Service may be used to access Envoy&#39;s admin interface, which Contour normally prevents from access outside the Envoy container. This can be used to shut down Envoy remotely (a denial of service), or to expose the existence of any Secret that Envoy is using for its configuration, including most notably TLS Keypairs. However, it *cannot* be used to get the *content* of those secrets.</p> <p>Since this attack allows access to the administration interface, a variety of administration options are available, such as shutting down the Envoy or draining traffic. In general, the Envoy admin interface cannot easily be used for making changes to the cluster, in-flight requests, or backend services, but it could be used to shut down or drain Envoy, change traffic routing, or to retrieve secret metadata, as mentioned above.</p> <p>### Patches The issue will be addressed in the forthcoming Contour v1.18.0 and a patch release, v1.17.1, has been released in the meantime.</p> <p>It is addressed in two ways: - disabling ExternalName type Services by default - When ExternalName Services are enabled, block obvious &#34;localhost&#34; entries.</p> <p>#### Disable ExternalName type Services by default</p> <p>This change prohibits processing of ExternalName services unless the cluster operator specifically allows them using the new `--enable-externalname` flag or equivalent configuration file setting. This is a breaking change f…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5ph6-qq5x-7jwc https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2021-32783 gsd-2021-32783 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2021-32783