Most recent entries from all

bdu:2022-06387

EUVD-2026-28106

fkie_cve-2021-32724

check-spelling is a github action which provides CI spell checking. In affected versions and for a repository with the [check-spelling action](https://github.com/marketplace/actions/check-spelling) enabled that triggers on `pull_request_target` (or `schedule`), an attacker can send a crafted Pull Request that causes a `GITHUB_TOKEN` to be exposed. With the `GITHUB_TOKEN`, it's possible to push commits to the repository bypassing standard approval processes. Commits to the repository could then steal any/all secrets available to the repository. As a workaround users may can either: [Disable the workflow](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/managing-workflow-runs/disabling-and-enabling-a-workflow) until you've fixed all branches or Set repository to [Allow specific actions](https://docs.github.com/en/github/administering-a-repository/managing-repository-settings/disabling-or-limiting-github-actions-for-a-repository#allowing-specific-actions-to-run). check-spelling isn't a verified creator and it certainly won't be anytime soon. You could then explicitly add other actions that your repository uses. Set repository [Workflow permissions](https://docs.github.com/en/github/administering-a-repository/managing-repository-settings/disabling-or-limiting-github-actions-for-a-repository#setting-the-permissions-of-the-github_token-for-your-repository) to `Read repository contents permission`. Workflows using `check-spelling/check-spelling@main` will get the fix automatically. Workflows usi…

GHSA-g86g-chm8-7r2p — check-spelling workflow vulnerable to token leakage via symlink attack

Affected: GitHub Actions: check-spelling/check-spelling

### Impact For a repository with the [check-spelling action](https://github.com/marketplace/actions/check-spelling) enabled that triggers on `pull_request_target` (or `schedule`), an attacker can send a crafted Pull Request that causes a `GITHUB_TOKEN` to be exposed.

With the `GITHUB_TOKEN`, it's possible to push commits to the repository bypassing standard approval processes. Commits to the repository could then steal any/all secrets available to the repository.

### Workarounds

You can either: * [Disable the workflow](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/managing-workflow-runs/disabling-and-enabling-a-workflow) until you've fixed **all branches**.

or * Set repository to [Allow specific actions](https://docs.github.com/en/github/administering-a-repository/managing-repository-settings/disabling-or-limiting-github-actions-for-a-repository#allowing-specific-actions-to-run). You can check: - [x] `Allow actions created by GitHub` - [x] `Allow Marketplace actions by verified creators`

[check-spelling](https://github.com/check-spelling) isn't a verified creator and it certainly won't be anytime soon. You could then explicitly add other actions that your repository uses.

or * Set repository [Workflow permissions](https://docs.github.com/en/github/administering-a-repository/managing-repository-settings/disabling-or-limiting-github-actions-for-a-repository#setting-the-permissions-of-the-github_token-for-your-repository) to `Read repository contents permission`.

### Solut…

Most recent entries from all

bdu:2022-06387

EUVD-2026-28106

fkie_cve-2021-32724

GHSA-g86g-chm8-7r2p — check-spelling workflow vulnerable to token leakage via symlink attack

gsd-2021-32724