https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 05 Oct 2026 20:45:28 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2021-04604 bdu:2021-04604 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2021-04604 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-26051 EUVD-2026-26051 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-26051 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2021-28687 <p>HVM soft-reset crashes toolstack libxl requires all data structures passed across its public interface to be initialized before use and disposed of afterwards by calling a specific set of functions. Many internal data structures also require this initialize / dispose discipline, but not all of them. When the &#34;soft reset&#34; feature was implemented, the libxl__domain_suspend_state structure didn&#39;t require any initialization or disposal. At some point later, an initialization function was introduced for the structure; but the &#34;soft reset&#34; path wasn&#39;t refactored to call the initialization function. When a guest nwo initiates a &#34;soft reboot&#34;, uninitialized data structure leads to an assert() when later code finds the structure in an unexpected state. The effect of this is to crash the process monitoring the guest. How this affects the system depends on the structure of the toolstack. For xl, this will have no security-relevant effect: every VM has its own independent monitoring process, which contains no state. The domain in question will hang in a crashed state, but can be destroyed by `xl destroy` just like any other non-cooperating domain. For daemon-based toolstacks linked against libxl, such as libvirt, this will crash the toolstack, losing the state of any in-progress operations (localized DoS), and preventing further administrator operations unless the daemon is configured to restart automatically (system-wide DoS). If crashes &#34;leak&#34; resources, then repeated crashes could us…</p> <p>HVM soft-reset crashes toolstack libxl requires all data structures passed across its public interface to be initialized before use and disposed of afterwards by calling a specific set of functions. Many internal data structures also require this initialize / dispose discipline, but not all of them. When the &#34;soft reset&#34; feature was implemented, the libxl__domain_suspend_state structure didn&#39;t require any initialization or disposal. At some point later, an initialization function was introduced for the structure; but the &#34;soft reset&#34; path wasn&#39;t refactored to call the initialization function. When a guest nwo initiates a &#34;soft reboot&#34;, uninitialized data structure leads to an assert() when later code finds the structure in an unexpected state. The effect of this is to crash the process monitoring the guest. How this affects the system depends on the structure of the toolstack. For xl, this will have no security-relevant effect: every VM has its own independent monitoring process, which contains no state. The domain in question will hang in a crashed state, but can be destroyed by `xl destroy` just like any other non-cooperating domain. For daemon-based toolstacks linked against libxl, such as libvirt, this will crash the toolstack, losing the state of any in-progress operations (localized DoS), and preventing further administrator operations unless the daemon is configured to restart automatically (system-wide DoS). If crashes &#34;leak&#34; resources, then repeated crashes could us…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2021-28687 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-f8g3-gxq4-xqv7 <p>HVM soft-reset crashes toolstack libxl requires all data structures passed across its public interface to be initialized before use and disposed of afterwards by calling a specific set of functions. Many internal data structures also require this initialize / dispose discipline, but not all of them. When the &#34;soft reset&#34; feature was implemented, the libxl__domain_suspend_state structure didn&#39;t require any initialization or disposal. At some point later, an initialization function was introduced for the structure; but the &#34;soft reset&#34; path wasn&#39;t refactored to call the initialization function. When a guest nwo initiates a &#34;soft reboot&#34;, uninitialized data structure leads to an assert() when later code finds the structure in an unexpected state. The effect of this is to crash the process monitoring the guest. How this affects the system depends on the structure of the toolstack. For xl, this will have no security-relevant effect: every VM has its own independent monitoring process, which contains no state. The domain in question will hang in a crashed state, but can be destroyed by `xl destroy` just like any other non-cooperating domain. For daemon-based toolstacks linked against libxl, such as libvirt, this will crash the toolstack, losing the state of any in-progress operations (localized DoS), and preventing further administrator operations unless the daemon is configured to restart automatically (system-wide DoS). If crashes &#34;leak&#34; resources, then repeated crashes could us…</p> <p>HVM soft-reset crashes toolstack libxl requires all data structures passed across its public interface to be initialized before use and disposed of afterwards by calling a specific set of functions. Many internal data structures also require this initialize / dispose discipline, but not all of them. When the &#34;soft reset&#34; feature was implemented, the libxl__domain_suspend_state structure didn&#39;t require any initialization or disposal. At some point later, an initialization function was introduced for the structure; but the &#34;soft reset&#34; path wasn&#39;t refactored to call the initialization function. When a guest nwo initiates a &#34;soft reboot&#34;, uninitialized data structure leads to an assert() when later code finds the structure in an unexpected state. The effect of this is to crash the process monitoring the guest. How this affects the system depends on the structure of the toolstack. For xl, this will have no security-relevant effect: every VM has its own independent monitoring process, which contains no state. The domain in question will hang in a crashed state, but can be destroyed by `xl destroy` just like any other non-cooperating domain. For daemon-based toolstacks linked against libxl, such as libvirt, this will crash the toolstack, losing the state of any in-progress operations (localized DoS), and preventing further administrator operations unless the daemon is configured to restart automatically (system-wide DoS). If crashes &#34;leak&#34; resources, then repeated crashes could us…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-f8g3-gxq4-xqv7 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2021-28687 gsd-2021-28687 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2021-28687 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2024:11520-1 <p>xen-4.15.1_01-1.2 on GA media</p> <p>xen-4.15.1_01-1.2 on GA media</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2024:11520-1 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2021:1023-1 <p>Security update for xen</p> <p>Security update for xen</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2021:1023-1