https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 06 Oct 2026 13:36:07 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-22223 EUVD-2026-22223 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-22223 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2021-21413 <p>isolated-vm is a library for nodejs which gives you access to v8&#39;s Isolate interface. Versions of isolated-vm before v4.0.0 have API pitfalls which may make it easy for implementers to expose supposed secure isolates to the permissions of the main nodejs isolate. Reference objects allow access to the underlying reference&#39;s full prototype chain. In an environment where the implementer has exposed a Reference instance to an attacker they would be able to use it to acquire a Reference to the nodejs context&#39;s Function object. Similar application-specific attacks could be possible by modifying the local prototype of other API objects. Access to NativeModule objects could allow an attacker to load and run native code from anywhere on the filesystem. If combined with, for example, a file upload API this would allow for arbitrary code execution. This is addressed in v4.0.0 through a series of related changes.</p> <p>isolated-vm is a library for nodejs which gives you access to v8&#39;s Isolate interface. Versions of isolated-vm before v4.0.0 have API pitfalls which may make it easy for implementers to expose supposed secure isolates to the permissions of the main nodejs isolate. Reference objects allow access to the underlying reference&#39;s full prototype chain. In an environment where the implementer has exposed a Reference instance to an attacker they would be able to use it to acquire a Reference to the nodejs context&#39;s Function object. Similar application-specific attacks could be possible by modifying the local prototype of other API objects. Access to NativeModule objects could allow an attacker to load and run native code from anywhere on the filesystem. If combined with, for example, a file upload API this would allow for arbitrary code execution. This is addressed in v4.0.0 through a series of related changes.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2021-21413 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mmhj-4w6j-76h7 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: isolated-vm</p> <p>Versions of `isolated-vm` before v4.0.0, and especially before v3.0.0, have API pitfalls which may make it easy for implementers to expose supposed secure isolates to the permissions of the main nodejs isolate.</p> <p>`Reference` objects allow access to the underlying reference&#39;s full prototype chain. In an environment where the implementer has exposed a `Reference` instance to an attacker they would be able to use it to acquire a `Reference` to the nodejs context&#39;s `Function` object.</p> <p>Similar application-specific attacks could be possible by modifying the local prototype of other API objects.</p> <p>Access to `NativeModule` objects could allow an attacker to load and run native code from anywhere on the filesystem. If combined with, for example, a file upload API this would allow for arbitrary code execution.</p> <p>To address these issues the following changes were made in v4.0.0: - Documentation was updated with more explicit guidelines on building secure applications. - `Reference` instances will no longer follow prototype chains by default, nor will they invoke accessors or proxies. - All `isolated-vm` API prototypes are now immutable. - `NativeModule` constructor may only be invoked from a nodejs isolate.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: isolated-vm</p> <p>Versions of `isolated-vm` before v4.0.0, and especially before v3.0.0, have API pitfalls which may make it easy for implementers to expose supposed secure isolates to the permissions of the main nodejs isolate.</p> <p>`Reference` objects allow access to the underlying reference&#39;s full prototype chain. In an environment where the implementer has exposed a `Reference` instance to an attacker they would be able to use it to acquire a `Reference` to the nodejs context&#39;s `Function` object.</p> <p>Similar application-specific attacks could be possible by modifying the local prototype of other API objects.</p> <p>Access to `NativeModule` objects could allow an attacker to load and run native code from anywhere on the filesystem. If combined with, for example, a file upload API this would allow for arbitrary code execution.</p> <p>To address these issues the following changes were made in v4.0.0: - Documentation was updated with more explicit guidelines on building secure applications. - `Reference` instances will no longer follow prototype chains by default, nor will they invoke accessors or proxies. - All `isolated-vm` API prototypes are now immutable. - `NativeModule` constructor may only be invoked from a nodejs isolate.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mmhj-4w6j-76h7 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2021-21413 gsd-2021-21413 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2021-21413