<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 18:31:12 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-21651</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-21651</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-21651</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-21651</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2021-20319</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2021-20319</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;An improper signature verification vulnerability was found in coreos-installer. A specially crafted gzip installation image can bypass the image signature verification and as a consequence can lead to the installation of unsigned content. An attacker able to modify the original installation image can write arbitrary data, and achieve full access to the node being installed.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;An improper signature verification vulnerability was found in coreos-installer. A specially crafted gzip installation image can bypass the image signature verification and as a consequence can lead to the installation of unsigned content. An attacker able to modify the original installation image can write arbitrary data, and achieve full access to the node being installed.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2021-20319</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-3r3g-g73x-g593 — coreos-installer improperly verifies GPG signature when decompressing gzipped artifact</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3r3g-g73x-g593</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: coreos-installer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;coreos-installer fails to correctly verify GPG signatures when decompressing gzip-compressed artifacts.  This allows bypass of signature verification in cases where coreos-installer decompresses a downloaded OS image, allowing an attacker who can modify the OS image to compromise a newly-installed system.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Default installations from ISO or PXE media in Fedora CoreOS, RHEL CoreOS, and RHEL for Edge are **not** affected, as coreos-installer installs from an OS image shipped as part of the install media.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;These flows are affected:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1.  Installing with `--image-file`, `--image-url`, or `coreos.inst.image_url`.  For example, if a user has a local mirror of installation images, an attacker could replace an image with a gzip-compressed alternative (even if the file extension is `.xz`).  The result:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
    $ coreos-installer install --image-url http://localhost:8080/image.xz /dev/loop0
    Downloading image from http://localhost:8080/image.xz
    Downloading signature from http://localhost:8080/image.xz.sig
    &amp;gt; Read disk 749.9 MiB/749.9 MiB (100%)
    gpg: Signature made Mon 20 Sep 2021 02:41:50 PM EDT
    gpg: using RSA key 8C5BA6990BDB26E19F2A1A801161AE6945719A39
    gpg: BAD signature from &amp;#34;Fedora (34) &amp;lt;fedora-34-primary@fedoraproject.org&amp;gt;&amp;#34; [ultimate]
    Install complete.
    ```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Notice that GPG reports a bad signature, but coreos-installer continues anyway.  Automation that relies on coreos-installer&amp;#39;s exit status will not notice either.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. `coreos-ins…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: coreos-installer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;coreos-installer fails to correctly verify GPG signatures when decompressing gzip-compressed artifacts.  This allows bypass of signature verification in cases where coreos-installer decompresses a downloaded OS image, allowing an attacker who can modify the OS image to compromise a newly-installed system.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Default installations from ISO or PXE media in Fedora CoreOS, RHEL CoreOS, and RHEL for Edge are **not** affected, as coreos-installer installs from an OS image shipped as part of the install media.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;These flows are affected:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1.  Installing with `--image-file`, `--image-url`, or `coreos.inst.image_url`.  For example, if a user has a local mirror of installation images, an attacker could replace an image with a gzip-compressed alternative (even if the file extension is `.xz`).  The result:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
    $ coreos-installer install --image-url http://localhost:8080/image.xz /dev/loop0
    Downloading image from http://localhost:8080/image.xz
    Downloading signature from http://localhost:8080/image.xz.sig
    &amp;gt; Read disk 749.9 MiB/749.9 MiB (100%)
    gpg: Signature made Mon 20 Sep 2021 02:41:50 PM EDT
    gpg: using RSA key 8C5BA6990BDB26E19F2A1A801161AE6945719A39
    gpg: BAD signature from &amp;#34;Fedora (34) &amp;lt;fedora-34-primary@fedoraproject.org&amp;gt;&amp;#34; [ultimate]
    Install complete.
    ```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Notice that GPG reports a bad signature, but coreos-installer continues anyway.  Automation that relies on coreos-installer&amp;#39;s exit status will not notice either.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. `coreos-ins…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3r3g-g73x-g593</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>gsd-2021-20319</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2021-20319</link>
      <description>gsd-2021-20319</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2021-20319</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RHSA-2021:3926 — Red Hat Security Advisory: OpenShift Container Platform 4.8.17 security and bug fix update</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2021:3926</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;coreos-installer: incorrect signature verification on gzip-compressed install images&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;coreos-installer: incorrect signature verification on gzip-compressed install images&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2021:3926</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RUSTSEC-2022-0103 — Incorrect signature verification on gzip-compressed install images</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rustsec-2022-0103</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: coreos-installer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The coreos-installer is a program to fetch a disk image and
stream it to a target disk.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;During the installation process the installation image gpg
signatures are verified.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The signature verification can be bypassed for gzip-compressed
images due to a flaw in gzip coreos-installer wrapper.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the decoder encounters the gzip trailer, it signals EOF
to its output and does not continue reading from its input.
As a result, earlier wrappers don&amp;#39;t notice that they&amp;#39;ve reached
EOF.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In particular, the GPG wrapper does not check the exit code of GPG.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thus, if an attacker can substitute an attacker-controlled
gzipped disk image, installation will complete successfully
without a valid signature.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This vulnerability impacts only specific, User-Provisioned
Infrastructure (UPI) installation methods where coreos-installer
is used and where gzip-compressed images are configured as
the installation source.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Installer-Provisioned Infrastructure (IPI) bare-metal
installs do use coreos-installer, but this installation
method uses an install image embedded in the live OS image
(ISO or PXE image), therefore is not affected by this
vulnerability.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This vulnerability is specific to some upstream Fedora
CoreOS installation flows.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: coreos-installer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The coreos-installer is a program to fetch a disk image and
stream it to a target disk.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;During the installation process the installation image gpg
signatures are verified.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The signature verification can be bypassed for gzip-compressed
images due to a flaw in gzip coreos-installer wrapper.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the decoder encounters the gzip trailer, it signals EOF
to its output and does not continue reading from its input.
As a result, earlier wrappers don&amp;#39;t notice that they&amp;#39;ve reached
EOF.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In particular, the GPG wrapper does not check the exit code of GPG.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thus, if an attacker can substitute an attacker-controlled
gzipped disk image, installation will complete successfully
without a valid signature.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This vulnerability impacts only specific, User-Provisioned
Infrastructure (UPI) installation methods where coreos-installer
is used and where gzip-compressed images are configured as
the installation source.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Installer-Provisioned Infrastructure (IPI) bare-metal
installs do use coreos-installer, but this installation
method uses an install image embedded in the live OS image
(ISO or PXE image), therefore is not affected by this
vulnerability.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This vulnerability is specific to some upstream Fedora
CoreOS installation flows.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rustsec-2022-0103</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
