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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>EUVD-2026-42778</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-42778</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-42778</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-42778</guid>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2020-15234</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2020-15234</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;ORY Fosite is a security first OAuth2 &amp;amp; OpenID Connect framework for Go. In Fosite before version 0.34.1, the OAuth 2.0 Client&amp;#39;s registered redirect URLs and the redirect URL provided at the OAuth2 Authorization Endpoint where compared using strings.ToLower while they should have been compared with a simple string match. This allows an attacker to register a client with allowed redirect URL https://example.com/callback. Then perform an OAuth2 flow and requesting redirect URL https://example.com/CALLBACK. Instead of an error (invalid redirect URL), the browser is redirected to https://example.com/CALLBACK with a potentially successful OAuth2 response, depending on the state of the overall OAuth2 flow (the user might still deny the request for example). This vulnerability has been patched in ORY Fosite v0.34.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;ORY Fosite is a security first OAuth2 &amp;amp; OpenID Connect framework for Go. In Fosite before version 0.34.1, the OAuth 2.0 Client&amp;#39;s registered redirect URLs and the redirect URL provided at the OAuth2 Authorization Endpoint where compared using strings.ToLower while they should have been compared with a simple string match. This allows an attacker to register a client with allowed redirect URL https://example.com/callback. Then perform an OAuth2 flow and requesting redirect URL https://example.com/CALLBACK. Instead of an error (invalid redirect URL), the browser is redirected to https://example.com/CALLBACK with a potentially successful OAuth2 response, depending on the state of the overall OAuth2 flow (the user might still deny the request for example). This vulnerability has been patched in ORY Fosite v0.34.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2020-15234</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-grfp-q2mm-hfp6 — Redirect URL matching ignores character casing</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-grfp-q2mm-hfp6</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/ory/fosite&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Before version v0.34.1, the OAuth 2.0 Client&amp;#39;s registered redirect URLs and the redirect URL provided at the OAuth2 Authorization Endpoint where compared using `strings.ToLower` while they should have been compared with a simple string match:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Registering a client with allowed redirect URL `https://example.com/callback`
2. Performing OAuth2 flow and requesting redirect URL `https://example.com/CALLBACK`
3. Instead of an error (invalid redirect URL), the browser is redirected to `https://example.com/CALLBACK` with a potentially successful OAuth2 response, depending on the state of the overall OAuth2 flow (the user might still deny the request for example).&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/ory/fosite&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Before version v0.34.1, the OAuth 2.0 Client&amp;#39;s registered redirect URLs and the redirect URL provided at the OAuth2 Authorization Endpoint where compared using `strings.ToLower` while they should have been compared with a simple string match:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Registering a client with allowed redirect URL `https://example.com/callback`
2. Performing OAuth2 flow and requesting redirect URL `https://example.com/CALLBACK`
3. Instead of an error (invalid redirect URL), the browser is redirected to `https://example.com/CALLBACK` with a potentially successful OAuth2 response, depending on the state of the overall OAuth2 flow (the user might still deny the request for example).&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-grfp-q2mm-hfp6</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>gsd-2020-15234</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2020-15234</link>
      <description>gsd-2020-15234</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2020-15234</guid>
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