Most recent entries from all

Most recent entries from all https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 02 Oct 2026 17:25:37 +0000 bdu:2020-01887 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2020-01887 bdu:2020-01887 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2020-01887 Withdrawn: BELL-CVE-2018-16873 — CVE-2018-16873 does not affect BellSoft software https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2018-16873 <p><strong>Withdrawn by the publisher.</strong></p> <p><strong>Withdrawn by the publisher.</strong></p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2018-16873 cnvd-2018-25737 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cnvd-2018-25737 cnvd-2018-25737 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cnvd-2018-25737 EUVD-2026-68358 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-68358 EUVD-2026-68358 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-68358 fkie_cve-2018-16873 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2018-16873 <p>In Go before 1.10.6 and 1.11.x before 1.11.3, the "go get" command is vulnerable to remote code execution when executed with the -u flag and the import path of a malicious Go package, or a package that imports it directly or indirectly. Specifically, it is only vulnerable in GOPATH mode, but not in module mode (the distinction is documented at https://golang.org/cmd/go/#hdr-Module_aware_go_get). Using custom domains, it's possible to arrange things so that a Git repository is cloned to a folder named ".git" by using a vanity import path that ends with "/.git". If the Git repository root contains a "HEAD" file, a "config" file, an "objects" directory, a "refs" directory, with some work to ensure the proper ordering of operations, "go get -u" can be tricked into considering the parent directory as a repository root, and running Git commands on it. That will use the "config" file in the original Git repository root for its configuration, and if that config file contains malicious commands, they will execute on the system running "go get -u".</p> <p>In Go before 1.10.6 and 1.11.x before 1.11.3, the "go get" command is vulnerable to remote code execution when executed with the -u flag and the import path of a malicious Go package, or a package that imports it directly or indirectly. Specifically, it is only vulnerable in GOPATH mode, but not in module mode (the distinction is documented at https://golang.org/cmd/go/#hdr-Module_aware_go_get). Using custom domains, it's possible to arrange things so that a Git repository is cloned to a folder named ".git" by using a vanity import path that ends with "/.git". If the Git repository root contains a "HEAD" file, a "config" file, an "objects" directory, a "refs" directory, with some work to ensure the proper ordering of operations, "go get -u" can be tricked into considering the parent directory as a repository root, and running Git commands on it. That will use the "config" file in the original Git repository root for its configuration, and if that config file contains malicious commands, they will execute on the system running "go get -u".</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2018-16873 GHSA-q6pp-3q54-qw37 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-q6pp-3q54-qw37 <p>In Go before 1.10.6 and 1.11.x before 1.11.3, the "go get" command is vulnerable to remote code execution when executed with the -u flag and the import path of a malicious Go package, or a package that imports it directly or indirectly. Specifically, it is only vulnerable in GOPATH mode, but not in module mode (the distinction is documented at https://golang.org/cmd/go/#hdr-Module_aware_go_get). Using custom domains, it's possible to arrange things so that a Git repository is cloned to a folder named ".git" by using a vanity import path that ends with "/.git". If the Git repository root contains a "HEAD" file, a "config" file, an "objects" directory, a "refs" directory, with some work to ensure the proper ordering of operations, "go get -u" can be tricked into considering the parent directory as a repository root, and running Git commands on it. That will use the "config" file in the original Git repository root for its configuration, and if that config file contains malicious commands, they will execute on the system running "go get -u".</p> <p>In Go before 1.10.6 and 1.11.x before 1.11.3, the "go get" command is vulnerable to remote code execution when executed with the -u flag and the import path of a malicious Go package, or a package that imports it directly or indirectly. Specifically, it is only vulnerable in GOPATH mode, but not in module mode (the distinction is documented at https://golang.org/cmd/go/#hdr-Module_aware_go_get). Using custom domains, it's possible to arrange things so that a Git repository is cloned to a folder named ".git" by using a vanity import path that ends with "/.git". If the Git repository root contains a "HEAD" file, a "config" file, an "objects" directory, a "refs" directory, with some work to ensure the proper ordering of operations, "go get -u" can be tricked into considering the parent directory as a repository root, and running Git commands on it. That will use the "config" file in the original Git repository root for its configuration, and if that config file contains malicious commands, they will execute on the system running "go get -u".</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-q6pp-3q54-qw37 gsd-2018-16873 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2018-16873 gsd-2018-16873 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2018-16873 openSUSE-SU-2019:0189-1 — Security update for docker https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2019:0189-1 <p>Security update for docker</p> <p>Security update for docker</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2019:0189-1 SUSE-SU-2018:4297-1 — Security update for containerd, docker and go https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2018:4297-1 <p>Security update for containerd, docker and go</p> <p>Security update for containerd, docker and go</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2018:4297-1 UBUNTU-CVE-2018-16873 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2018-16873 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:14.04:LTS: golang-1.10, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: golang-1.10, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: golang-1.6, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: golang-1.10, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: golang-1.8, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: golang-1.9</p> <p>In Go before 1.10.6 and 1.11.x before 1.11.3, the "go get" command is vulnerable to remote code execution when executed with the -u flag and the import path of a malicious Go package, or a package that imports it directly or indirectly. Specifically, it is only vulnerable in GOPATH mode, but not in module mode (the distinction is documented at https://golang.org/cmd/go/#hdr-Module_aware_go_get). Using custom domains, it's possible to arrange things so that a Git repository is cloned to a folder named ".git" by using a vanity import path that ends with "/.git". If the Git repository root contains a "HEAD" file, a "config" file, an "objects" directory, a "refs" directory, with some work to ensure the proper ordering of operations, "go get -u" can be tricked into considering the parent directory as a repository root, and running Git commands on it. That will use the "config" file in the original Git repository root for its configuration, and if that config file contains malicious commands, they will execute on the system running "go get -u".</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:14.04:LTS: golang-1.10, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: golang-1.10, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: golang-1.6, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: golang-1.10, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: golang-1.8, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: golang-1.9</p> <p>In Go before 1.10.6 and 1.11.x before 1.11.3, the "go get" command is vulnerable to remote code execution when executed with the -u flag and the import path of a malicious Go package, or a package that imports it directly or indirectly. Specifically, it is only vulnerable in GOPATH mode, but not in module mode (the distinction is documented at https://golang.org/cmd/go/#hdr-Module_aware_go_get). Using custom domains, it's possible to arrange things so that a Git repository is cloned to a folder named ".git" by using a vanity import path that ends with "/.git". If the Git repository root contains a "HEAD" file, a "config" file, an "objects" directory, a "refs" directory, with some work to ensure the proper ordering of operations, "go get -u" can be tricked into considering the parent directory as a repository root, and running Git commands on it. That will use the "config" file in the original Git repository root for its configuration, and if that config file contains malicious commands, they will execute on the system running "go get -u".</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2018-16873