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  <updated>2026-10-07T11:36:43.174434+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2022-48733</id>
    <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2022-48733</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T11:36:43.974408+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 113 more</p>
<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix use-after-free after failure to create a snapshot At ioctl.c:create_snapshot(), we allocate a pending snapshot structure and then attach it to the transaction's list of pending snapshots. After that we call btrfs_commit_transaction(), and if that returns an error we jump to 'fail' label, where we kfree() the pending snapshot structure. This can result in a later use-after-free of the pending snapshot: 1) We allocated the pending snapshot and added it to the transaction's    list of pending snapshots; 2) We call btrfs_commit_transaction(), and it fails either at the first    call to btrfs_run_delayed_refs() or btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups().    In both cases, we don't abort the transaction and we release our    transaction handle. We jump to the 'fail' label and free the pending    snapshot structure. We return with the pending snapshot still in the    transaction's list; 3) Another task commits the transaction. This time there's no error at    all, and then during the transaction commit it accesses a pointer    to the pending snapshot structure that the snapshot creation task    has already freed, resulting in a user-after-free. This issue could actually be detected by smatch, which produced the following warning:   fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:843 create_snapshot() warn: '&amp;pending_snapshot-&gt;list' not removed from list So fix this by not having the snapshot creation ioctl directly add the pending snapshot t…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2022-48733"/>
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