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  <updated>2026-10-16T00:42:57.971108+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2025-21632</id>
    <title>CVE-2025-21632 — x86/fpu: Ensure shadow stack is active before "getting" registers</title>
    <updated>2026-10-16T00:42:58.013121+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p>
<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>x86/fpu: Ensure shadow stack is active before "getting" registers</p>
<p>The x86 shadow stack support has its own set of registers. Those registers
are XSAVE-managed, but they are "supervisor state components" which means
that userspace can not touch them with XSAVE/XRSTOR.  It also means that
they are not accessible from the existing ptrace ABI for XSAVE state.
Thus, there is a new ptrace get/set interface for it.</p>
<p>The regset code that ptrace uses provides an -&gt;active() handler in
addition to the get/set ones. For shadow stack this -&gt;active() handler
verifies that shadow stack is enabled via the ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK bit in the
thread struct. The -&gt;active() handler is checked from some call sites of
the regset get/set handlers, but not the ptrace ones. This was not
understood when shadow stack support was put in place.</p>
<p>As a result, both the set/get handlers can be called with
XFEATURE_CET_USER in its init state, which would cause get_xsave_addr() to
return NULL and trigger a WARN_ON(). The ssp_set() handler luckily has an
ssp_active() check to avoid surprising the kernel with shadow stack
behavior when the kernel is not ready for it (ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK==0). That
check just happened to avoid the warning.</p>
<p>But the -&gt;get() side wasn't so lucky. It can be called with shadow stacks
disabled, triggering the warning in practice, as reported by Christina
Schimpe:</p>
<p>WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 1773 at arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c:198…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2025-21632"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/usn-7379-1</id>
    <title>USN-7379-1 — linux, linux-aws, linux-azure, linux-gcp, linux-hwe-6.11, linux-oracle, linux-realtime vulnerabilities</title>
    <updated>2026-10-16T00:42:58.013255+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: linux-hwe-6.11</p>
<p>Several security issues were discovered in the Linux kernel.
An attacker could possibly use these to compromise the system.
This update corrects flaws in the following subsystems:
  - ARM64 architecture;
  - MIPS architecture;
  - PowerPC architecture;
  - RISC-V architecture;
  - S390 architecture;
  - x86 architecture;
  - Block layer subsystem;
  - Compute Acceleration Framework;
  - ACPI drivers;
  - Drivers core;
  - Ublk userspace block driver;
  - Virtio block driver;
  - Bluetooth drivers;
  - Buffer Sharing and Synchronization framework;
  - DMA engine subsystem;
  - EFI core;
  - GPIO subsystem;
  - GPU drivers;
  - HID subsystem;
  - Microsoft Hyper-V drivers;
  - Hardware monitoring drivers;
  - I3C subsystem;
  - IIO ADC drivers;
  - IIO subsystem;
  - InfiniBand drivers;
  - IOMMU subsystem;
  - LED subsystem;
  - Multiple devices driver;
  - Media drivers;
  - Microchip PCI driver;
  - MTD block device drivers;
  - Network drivers;
  - Mellanox network drivers;
  - STMicroelectronics network drivers;
  - NVME drivers;
  - PCI subsystem;
  - PHY drivers;
  - Pin controllers subsystem;
  - x86 platform drivers;
  - i.MX PM domains;
  - Power supply drivers;
  - Voltage and Current Regulator drivers;
  - SCSI subsystem;
  - i.MX SoC drivers;
  - SPI subsystem;
  - UFS subsystem;
  - USB Gadget drivers;
  - TDX Guest driver;
  - AFS file system;
  - BTRFS file system;
  - Ceph distributed file system;
  - File systems infrastructure;
  - F2FS file system;
  - JFFS…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/usn-7379-1"/>
  </entry>
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