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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-11-16T16:44:58.769987+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-123604</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-123604 — Hickory DNS 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 Resource Exhaustion DoS via NameServerPool::try_send TC-Retry Loop</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T16:44:58.772121+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> hickory-dns</p>
<p>Hickory DNS hickory-resolver 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contains an unbounded retry loop in NameServerPool::try_send, which re-queues truncated (TC) responses without checking the answering transport or counting iterations. A malicious authoritative server returning TC=1 on every transport keeps the resolver spinning on a persistent TCP connection until the 5-second request deadline expires, causing resource exhaustion.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-123604"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-6w6g-hm98-mhgm</id>
    <title>GHSA-6w6g-hm98-mhgm — hickory-resolver: Unbounded TC-retry loop in `NameServerPool::try_send` (resource-exhaustion DoS)</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T16:44:58.772189+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: hickory-resolver</p>
<p>When the `hickory-resolver` name server pool implementation receives an upstream response with the TC (truncated) header bit set, it re-queues the request to the same nameserver to retry with UDP transport disabled. However, the retry arm never inspects the transport that just answered and carries no iteration counter. An authoritative server that sets `TC=1` on **every** available transport  keeps the resolver spinning on one persistent TCP connection until the 5s per-request wall-clock deadline expires.</p>
<p>### Reporter</p>
<p>Qifan Zhang, Palo Alto Networks</p></div>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-6w6g-hm98-mhgm"/>
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