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  <updated>2026-10-02T22:28:03.468578+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-68537</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-68537 — Fulgur: Unbounded page slicing from attacker-controlled CSS height causes denial of service</title>
    <updated>2026-10-02T22:28:03.470670+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> fulgur-rs fulgur</p>
<p>`fulgur` converts untrusted HTML/CSS into PDF, commonly on a server that processes input supplied by many tenants. In versions prior to 0.19.0, a body-direct child whose CSS-resolved height greatly exceeds the page height was sliced into one fragment per page with no upper bound. This is fixed in version 0.19.0. A `MAX_PAGES` cap bounds the slice loop — halting it even for a `+inf` height — and non-finite layout heights are sanitized so they can no longer drive the loop. As a workaround, validate or constrain untrusted CSS (in particular `height` / `vh` on body-level elements) before passing HTML to fulgur.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-68537"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4rf6-qx84-q9fv</id>
    <title>GHSA-4rf6-qx84-q9fv — Fulgur: Non-painting replaced elements amplify to thousands of blank PDF pages (denial of service)</title>
    <updated>2026-10-02T22:28:03.470748+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: fulgur</p>
<p>`fulgur` converts untrusted HTML/CSS into PDF, commonly on a server that
processes input supplied by many tenants. In versions prior to 0.26.0, a
childless box that resolves to a pathologically tall height was amplified into
thousands of blank PDF pages, even when it produces no visible output.</p>
<p>The childless-collapse defense that would normally collapse such a box was gated
by a tag-only "replaced content" check, so any **non-painting replaced element**
bypassed it, including:</p>
<p>- an unresolved `src` (the common offline-first case),
- a `visibility:hidden` image,
- an undecodable image format, and
- an empty `&lt;svg&gt;`.</p>
<p>A trailing-sibling variant of the same gap was also open. A few bytes of HTML
therefore amplified into roughly `MAX_PAGES` (10,000) blank pages; the renderer
allocates and runs a per-page loop over them, producing CPU and memory
exhaustion. An attacker able to submit HTML to a fulgur-based conversion service
can trigger this with a trivially small payload, denying service to the host and
any co-tenants.</p>
<p>## Patches</p>
<p>Fixed in **0.26.0** (PR #575). The tag-only gate was removed so that any
pathologically tall childless box collapses regardless of whether it is a
replaced element, closing the missing-`src`, `visibility:hidden`,
undecodable-format, and empty-`&lt;svg&gt;` vectors at once, along with the
trailing-sibling variant.</p>
<p>## Workarounds</p>
<p>Upgrade to 0.26.0 or later. If upgrading is not immediately possible, validate
or constrain untrusted CSS (in particular very l…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4rf6-qx84-q9fv"/>
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