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  <updated>2026-10-02T17:08:23.884667+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-33055</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-33055 — tar-rs incorrectly ignores PAX size headers if header size is nonzero</title>
    <updated>2026-10-02T17:08:23.886383+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> alexcrichton tar-rs</p>
<p>tar-rs is a tar archive reading/writing library for Rust. Versions 0.4.44 and below have conditional logic that skips the PAX size header in cases where the base header size is nonzero. As part of CVE-2025-62518, the astral-tokio-tar project was changed to correctly honor PAX size headers in the case where it was different from the base header. This is almost the inverse of the astral-tokio-tar issue. Any discrepancy in how tar parsers honor file size can be used to create archives that appear differently when unpacked by different archivers. In this case, the tar-rs (Rust tar) crate is an outlier in checking for the header size - other tar parsers (including e.g. Go archive/tar) unconditionally use the PAX size override. This can affect anything that uses the tar crate to parse archives and expects to have a consistent view with other parsers. This issue has been fixed in version 0.4.45.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-33055"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-gchp-q4r4-x4ff</id>
    <title>GHSA-gchp-q4r4-x4ff — tar-rs incorrectly ignores PAX size headers if header size is nonzero</title>
    <updated>2026-10-02T17:08:23.886437+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: tar</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>As part of [CVE-2025-62518](https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-62518) the astral-tokio-tar project was changed to correctly honor PAX size headers in the case where it was different from the base header.</p>
<p>However, it was missed at the time that this project (the original Rust `tar` crate) had a conditional logic that skipped the PAX size header in the case that the base header size was nonzero - almost the inverse of the astral-tokio-tar issue.</p>
<p>The problem here is that *any* discrepancy in how tar parsers honor file size can be used to create archives that appear differently when unpacked by different archivers.</p>
<p>In this case, the tar-rs (Rust `tar`) crate is an outlier in checking for the header size - other tar parsers (including e.g. Go `archive/tar`) unconditionally use the PAX size override.</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>https://github.com/astral-sh/tokio-tar/blob/aafc2926f2034d6b3ad108e52d4cfc73df5d47a4/src/archive.rs#L578-L600
https://github.com/alexcrichton/tar-rs/blob/88b1e3b0da65b0c5b9750d1a75516145488f4793/src/archive.rs#L339-L344</p>
<p>### PoC</p>
<p>(originally posted by https://github.com/xokdvium)</p>
<p>&gt; I was worried that cargo might be vulnerable to malicious crates, but it turns out that crates.io has been rejecting both symlinks and hard links:</p>
<p>It seems like recent fixes to https://edera.dev/stories/tarmageddon have introduced a differential that could be used to smuggle symlinks into the registry that would get skipped over by `astral-tokio-tar` but not by `tar-…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-gchp-q4r4-x4ff"/>
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