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  <updated>2026-10-02T16:03:20.553532+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2024-35186</id>
    <title>CVE-2024-35186 — gix traversal outside working tree enables arbitrary code execution</title>
    <updated>2026-10-02T16:03:20.554953+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Byron gitoxide</p>
<p>gitoxide is a pure Rust implementation of Git. During checkout, `gix-worktree-state` does not verify that paths point to locations in the working tree. A specially crafted repository can, when cloned, place new files anywhere writable by the application. This vulnerability leads to a major loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability, but creating files outside a working tree without attempting to execute code can directly impact integrity as well. This vulnerability has been patched in version(s) 0.36.0.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2024-35186"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7w47-3wg8-547c</id>
    <title>GHSA-7w47-3wg8-547c — gix traversal outside working tree enables arbitrary code execution</title>
    <updated>2026-10-02T16:03:20.555017+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: gix-worktree-state, crates.io: gitoxide, crates.io: gix-fs, crates.io: gix-worktree, crates.io: gix, crates.io: gitoxide-core, crates.io: gix-index</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>During checkout, gitoxide does not verify that paths point to locations in the working tree. A specially crafted repository can, when cloned, place new files anywhere writable by the application.</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>Although `gix-worktree-state` checks for collisions with existing files, it does not itself check if a path is really in the working tree when performing a checkout, nor do the path checks in `gix-fs` and `gix-worktree` prevent this. Cloning an untrusted repository containing specially crafted tree or blob names will create new files outside the repository, or inside the repository or a submodule's `.git` directory. The simplest cases are:</p>
<p>- A tree named `..` to traverse upward. This facilitates arbitrary code execution because files can be placed in one or more locations where they are likely to be executed soon.
- A tree named `.git` to enter a `.git` directory. This facilitates arbitrary code execution because hooks can be installed.</p>
<p>A number of alternatives that achieve the same effect are also possible, some of which correspond to specific vulnerabilities that have affected Git in the past:</p>
<p>- A tree or blob whose name contains one or more `/`, to traverse upward or downward. For example, even without containing any tree named `..` or `.git`, a repository can represent a file named `../outside` or `.git/hooks/pre-commit`. This is distinct from the more intuitive case a repository containing trees that represent those paths.
- In Windows, a tree or b…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7w47-3wg8-547c"/>
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