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  <updated>2026-10-03T09:25:24.114734+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2024-32884</id>
    <title>CVE-2024-32884 — gix-transport indirect code execution via malicious username</title>
    <updated>2026-10-03T09:25:24.116477+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Byron gitoxide</p>
<p>gitoxide is a pure Rust implementation of Git. `gix-transport` does not check the username part of a URL for text that the external `ssh` program would interpret as an option. A specially crafted clone URL can smuggle options to SSH. The possibilities are syntactically limited, but if a malicious clone URL is used by an application whose current working directory contains a malicious file, arbitrary code execution occurs. This is related to the patched vulnerability GHSA-rrjw-j4m2-mf34, but appears less severe due to a greater attack complexity. This issue has been patched in versions 0.35.0, 0.42.0 and 0.62.0.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2024-32884"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-98p4-xjmm-8mfh</id>
    <title>GHSA-98p4-xjmm-8mfh — gix-transport indirect code execution via malicious username</title>
    <updated>2026-10-03T09:25:24.116531+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: gix-transport, crates.io: gix, crates.io: gitoxide</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>`gix-transport` does not check the username part of a URL for text that the external `ssh` program would interpret as an option. A specially crafted clone URL can smuggle options to SSH. The possibilities are syntactically limited, but if a malicious clone URL is used by an application whose current working directory contains a malicious file, arbitrary code execution occurs.</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>This is related to the patched vulnerability https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rrjw-j4m2-mf34, but appears less severe due to a greater attack complexity. Since https://github.com/Byron/gitoxide/pull/1032, `gix-transport` checks the host and path portions of a URL for text that has a `-` in a position that will cause `ssh` to interpret part of all of the URL as an option argument. But it does not check the non-mandatory username portion of the URL.</p>
<p>As in Git, when an address is a URL of the form `ssh://username@hostname/path`, or when it takes the special form `username@hostname:dirs/repo`, this is treated as an SSH URL. `gix-transport` will replace some characters in `username` with their `%`-based URL encodings, but otherwise passes `username@hostname` as an argument to the external `ssh` command. This happens even if `username` begins with a hyphen. In that case, `ssh` treats that argument as an option argument, and attempts to interpret and honor it as a sequence of one or more options possibly followed by an operand for the last option.</p>
<p>This is harder to exploit than G…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-98p4-xjmm-8mfh"/>
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