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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-03T18:37:37.849492+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2021-20319</id>
    <title>CVE-2021-20319</title>
    <updated>2026-10-03T18:37:37.866144+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> coreos-installer</p>
<p>An improper signature verification vulnerability was found in coreos-installer. A specially crafted gzip installation image can bypass the image signature verification and as a consequence can lead to the installation of unsigned content. An attacker able to modify the original installation image can write arbitrary data, and achieve full access to the node being installed.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2021-20319"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3r3g-g73x-g593</id>
    <title>GHSA-3r3g-g73x-g593 — coreos-installer improperly verifies GPG signature when decompressing gzipped artifact</title>
    <updated>2026-10-03T18:37:37.866198+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: coreos-installer</p>
<p>### Impact</p>
<p>coreos-installer fails to correctly verify GPG signatures when decompressing gzip-compressed artifacts.  This allows bypass of signature verification in cases where coreos-installer decompresses a downloaded OS image, allowing an attacker who can modify the OS image to compromise a newly-installed system.</p>
<p>Default installations from ISO or PXE media in Fedora CoreOS, RHEL CoreOS, and RHEL for Edge are **not** affected, as coreos-installer installs from an OS image shipped as part of the install media.</p>
<p>These flows are affected:</p>
<p>1.  Installing with `--image-file`, `--image-url`, or `coreos.inst.image_url`.  For example, if a user has a local mirror of installation images, an attacker could replace an image with a gzip-compressed alternative (even if the file extension is `.xz`).  The result:</p>
<p>```
    $ coreos-installer install --image-url http://localhost:8080/image.xz /dev/loop0
    Downloading image from http://localhost:8080/image.xz
    Downloading signature from http://localhost:8080/image.xz.sig
    &gt; Read disk 749.9 MiB/749.9 MiB (100%)
    gpg: Signature made Mon 20 Sep 2021 02:41:50 PM EDT
    gpg: using RSA key 8C5BA6990BDB26E19F2A1A801161AE6945719A39
    gpg: BAD signature from "Fedora (34) &lt;fedora-34-primary@fedoraproject.org&gt;" [ultimate]
    Install complete.
    ```</p>
<p>Notice that GPG reports a bad signature, but coreos-installer continues anyway.  Automation that relies on coreos-installer's exit status will not notice either.</p>
<p>2. `coreos-ins…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3r3g-g73x-g593"/>
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