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  <updated>2026-10-03T06:28:41.046486+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-28277</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-28277 — LangGraph: Unsafe msgpack deserialization in LangGraph checkpoint loading</title>
    <updated>2026-10-03T06:28:41.050006+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> langchain-ai langgraph</p>
<p>LangGraph SQLite Checkpoint is an implementation of LangGraph CheckpointSaver that uses SQLite DB (both sync and async, via aiosqlite). In version 1.0.9 and prior, LangGraph checkpointers can load msgpack-encoded checkpoints that reconstruct Python objects during deserialization. If an attacker can modify checkpoint data in the backing store (for example, after a database compromise or other privileged write access to the persistence layer), they can potentially supply a crafted payload that triggers unsafe object reconstruction when the checkpoint is loaded. No known patch is public.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-28277"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-g48c-2wqr-h844</id>
    <title>GHSA-g48c-2wqr-h844 — LangGraph checkpoint loading has unsafe msgpack deserialization</title>
    <updated>2026-10-03T06:28:41.050068+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: langgraph</p>
<p>LangGraph checkpointers can load msgpack-encoded checkpoints that reconstruct Python objects during deserialization. If an attacker can modify checkpoint data in the backing store (for example, after a database compromise or other privileged write access to the persistence layer), they can potentially supply a crafted payload that triggers unsafe object reconstruction when the checkpoint is loaded.</p>
<p>This is a **post-exploitation / defense-in-depth** issue. Exploitation requires the ability to write attacker-controlled checkpoint bytes at rest. In most deployments that prerequisite already implies a serious incident; the additional risk is turning “checkpoint-store write access” into code execution in the application runtime, which can expand blast radius (for example by exposing environment variables or cloud credentials available to the runtime).</p>
<p>There is no evidence of exploitation in the wild, and LangGraph is not aware of a practical exploitation path in existing deployments today. This change is intended to reduce the blast radius of a checkpoint-store compromise.</p>
<p>## Affected users / systems</p>
<p>Users may be affected if they:</p>
<p>- use a persistent checkpointer (database, remote store, shared filesystem, etc.),
- load/resume from checkpoints, and
- operate in an environment where an attacker could gain privileged write access to checkpoint data in the backing store.</p>
<p>This issue requires the attacker to be able to modify persisted checkpoint bytes (or to compromise a trusted…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-g48c-2wqr-h844"/>
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