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  <updated>2026-10-07T03:52:58.181059+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-47392</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-47392 — PraisonAI vulnerable to sandbox escape via `print.__self__` builtins module leak in `execute_code` (subprocess mode)</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T03:52:58.183103+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> MervinPraison PraisonAI, MervinPraison &lt; 1.6.40</p>
<p>PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.6.40 of PraisonAI, corresponding to version 1.6.40 of praisonaiagents, `execute_code()` in `praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py` (v1.6.37, subprocess sandbox mode) can be fully bypassed using `print.__self__` to retrieve the real Python `builtins` module, from which `__import__` can be extracted via `vars()` and runtime string construction. This achieves arbitrary OS command execution on the host, completely defeating the sandbox. This is a novel bypass that survives all patches for CVE-2026-39888 (frame traversal), CVE-2026-34938 (str subclass), and CVE-2026-40158 (`type.__getattribute__` trampoline). PraisonAI version 4.6.40 and praisonaiagents version 1.6.40 contain an updated fix.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-47392"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4mr5-g6f9-cfrh</id>
    <title>GHSA-4mr5-g6f9-cfrh — PraisonAI vulnerable to sandbox escape via `print.__self__` builtins module leak in `execute_code` (subprocess mode)</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T03:52:58.183180+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonaiagents, PyPI: PraisonAI</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>`execute_code()` in `praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py` (v1.6.37, subprocess sandbox mode) can be fully bypassed using `print.__self__` to retrieve the real Python `builtins` module, from which `__import__` can be extracted via `vars()` and runtime string construction. This achieves arbitrary OS command execution on the host, completely defeating the sandbox.</p>
<p>This is a **novel bypass** that survives all patches for CVE-2026-39888 (frame traversal), CVE-2026-34938 (str subclass), and CVE-2026-40158 (`type.__getattribute__` trampoline).</p>
<p>---</p>
<p>## Severity</p>
<p>**CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H — 9.9 Critical**</p>
<p>---</p>
<p>## Root Cause</p>
<p>Three independent gaps in the AST-based security validation:</p>
<p>### Gap 1: `__self__` missing from `_blocked_attrs`</p>
<p>In CPython, all built-in functions (C-level functions) have a `__self__` attribute that returns the module they belong to. The built-in functions in `safe_builtins` (`print`, `len`, `range`, etc.) are the *real* CPython built-in functions, so `print.__self__` returns `&lt;module 'builtins' (built-in)&gt;`.</p>
<p>The `_blocked_attrs` frozenset (line 52) does NOT include `__self__`. The AST check at line 74 only blocks attributes that are IN this set, so `print.__self__` passes.</p>
<p>### Gap 2: `vars` not blocked as callable or attribute</p>
<p>`builtins.vars(obj)` returns `obj.__dict__`. The function name `vars` is not in the AST `Call` blocklist (line 83: only blocks `exec`, `eval`, `compile`, `__import__`, `open`, `input`, `breakpoi…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4mr5-g6f9-cfrh"/>
  </entry>
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