https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-02T19:03:24.258880+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-44336 CVE-2026-44336 — PraisonAI MCP `tools/call` path-traversal and RCE via Python `.pth` injection 2026-10-02T19:03:24.260762+00:00

Affected: MervinPraison PraisonAI

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.6.34, PraisonAI's MCP (Model Context Protocol) server (praisonai mcp serve) registers four file-handling tools by default — praisonai.rules.create, praisonai.rules.show, praisonai.rules.delete, and praisonai.workflow.show. Each accepts a path or filename string from MCP tools/call arguments and joins it onto ~/.praison/rules/ (or, for workflow.show, accepts an absolute path) with no containment check. The JSON-RPC dispatcher passes params["arguments"] blind to each handler via **kwargs without validating against the advertised input schema. By setting rule_name="../../<some-path>" an attacker walks out of the rules directory and writes any file the running user can write. Dropping a Python .pth file into the user site-packages directory escalates this primitive to arbitrary code execution in any subsequent Python process the user spawns — the next praisonai CLI invocation, an IDE script run, the user's python REPL, or any background Python service. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.34.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-9mqq-jqxf-grvw GHSA-9mqq-jqxf-grvw — PraisonAI MCP `tools/call` path-traversal => RCE via Python `.pth` injection 2026-10-02T19:03:24.260825+00:00

Affected: PyPI: PraisonAI

## Summary

PraisonAI's MCP (Model Context Protocol) server (`praisonai mcp serve`) registers four file-handling tools by default — `praisonai.rules.create`, `praisonai.rules.show`, `praisonai.rules.delete`, and `praisonai.workflow.show`. Each accepts a path or filename string from MCP `tools/call` arguments and joins it onto `~/.praison/rules/` (or, for `workflow.show`, accepts an absolute path) **with no containment check**. The JSON-RPC dispatcher passes `params["arguments"]` blind to each handler via `**kwargs` without validating against the advertised input schema.

By setting `rule_name="../../<some-path>"` an attacker walks out of the rules directory and writes any file the running user can write. Dropping a Python `.pth` file into the user site-packages directory escalates this primitive to **arbitrary code execution in any subsequent Python process the user spawns** — the next `praisonai` CLI invocation, an IDE script run, the user's `python` REPL, or any background Python service. The same primitive is reachable from:

- An MCP-connected LLM (Claude Desktop, Cursor, Continue.dev, Claude Code) whose context is poisoned by attacker-controlled web content / documents / emails — **no operator click required beyond ordinary "ask the LLM to summarise this page" usage**. - `praisonai mcp serve --transport http-stream` with no `--api-key` (default), reachable from any local process / DNS-rebound browser tab / container neighbour sharing loopback. - Stdio MCP from any promp…