https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-02T14:00:50.522952+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-87995 CVE-2026-87995 — Open WebUI: Same-origin XSS to account takeover via terminal port-preview iframe hardcoding allow-same-origin 2026-10-02T14:00:50.524738+00:00

Affected: open-webui

Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. From 0.8.11 until 0.11.1, src/lib/components/chat/FileNav/PortPreview.svelte rendered terminal port content in an iframe sandbox containing both allow-scripts and allow-same-origin. Because the terminal proxy serves that content from the Open WebUI origin, an authenticated user with access to a shared terminal server could host script on a previewed port and take over a victim's account when the victim opened the preview. This issue is fixed in version 0.11.1.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jmc6-2wr8-h3wj GHSA-jmc6-2wr8-h3wj — Open WebUI: Same-origin XSS to account takeover via terminal port-preview iframe hardcoding allow-same-origin 2026-10-02T14:00:50.524794+00:00

Affected: PyPI: open-webui

## Summary Any authenticated user with access to a shared terminal server could get script of their choosing to run in the Open WebUI origin itself. The in-app port preview rendered the content of a previewed port in an iframe whose sandbox always granted `allow-same-origin` alongside `allow-scripts`, and that content is served from a path on the application's own origin, so the sandbox provided no isolation at all. Script served on a previewed port could read the victim's session token and take over the account.

## Preconditions - At least one terminal server configured by an admin (`TERMINAL_SERVER_CONNECTIONS`, empty by default) and reachable by both the attacker and the victim. Deployments with no terminal server configured are not affected. - The attacker needs a normal authenticated account with access to that terminal connection, no admin rights, plus the ability to start a process listening on a port there. - Personal terminals a user configures for themselves are not affected. Those carry an external URL, so the previewed document is cross-origin and the sandbox held. - The victim has to open the port list and click the attacker's port. - `TERMINAL_PROXY_HEADERS` unset and no `CONTENT_SECURITY_POLICY` set, which are the defaults. An operator who had already set a restrictive Content-Security-Policy through either was not exposed, since those headers apply to the proxied response. - The `iframeSandboxAllowSameOrigin` user setting is off by default, but the affected…