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  <updated>2026-10-02T16:11:28.070354+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-61539</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-61539 — Xinference: Remote code execution via unsafe `eval()` in Llama3 tool-call parsing</title>
    <updated>2026-10-02T16:11:28.101389+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> xorbitsai inference</p>
<p>Xinference is an inference API for running open-source, speech, and multimodal models. In 2.5.0 and earlier, Xinference passes attacker-influenced Llama3 tool-call output to eval() in xinference/model/llm/tool_parsers/llama3_tool_parser.py and xinference/model/llm/utils.py. Requests to /v1/chat/completions with a tools field flow through xinference/api/restful_api.py, xinference/model/llm/transformers/core.py, handle_chat_result_non_streaming(), and _post_process_completion() before extract_tool_calls() or _eval_llama3_chat_arguments() evaluates the model-generated Python expression. An unauthenticated remote attacker can influence that output through a crafted prompt and execute commands in the Xinference server process context. This issue is fixed in version 2.7.0.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-61539"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-x2rj-828p-hx9m</id>
    <title>GHSA-x2rj-828p-hx9m — Xinference vulnerable to remote code execution via unsafe `eval()` in Llama3 tool-call parsing</title>
    <updated>2026-10-02T16:11:28.101451+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: xinference</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>Xinference used Python's unsafe `eval()` function when parsing Llama3 tool-call output generated by a large language model. Because the model output can be influenced by attacker-controlled prompts sent to the chat completion API, a remote attacker can craft prompts that cause the model to return a Python expression. Xinference then evaluates that expression on the server while post-processing the tool-call result. In the tested default deployment, authentication was not enabled, so the vulnerability was exploitable by an unauthenticated remote attacker through the `/v1/chat/completions` endpoint.</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>Users can interact with deployed models through Xinference's OpenAI-compatible `/v1/chat/completions` API. The request entry point is implemented in `xinference/api/restful_api.py`; non-streaming requests call the model instance's `chat()` method and return the inference result.</p>
<p>When the Transformers backend is used, inference results flow through the batching logic in `xinference/model/llm/transformers/core.py`. Non-streaming chat results are handled by `handle_chat_result_non_streaming()`. If the request contains a `tools` field, Xinference calls `_post_process_completion()` to parse tool-call output from the model response.</p>
<p>The Llama3 tool-call parser is implemented in `xinference/model/llm/tool_parsers/llama3_tool_parser.py`. In affected versions, `extract_tool_calls()` parsed model output with `eval()`:</p>
<p>```python
def extract_tool_calls(
    self,…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-x2rj-828p-hx9m"/>
  </entry>
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