https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-03T03:28:42.378292+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-54727 CVE-2026-54727 — proot-distro has a Container Isolation Bypass via Crafted Restore Archive 2026-10-03T03:28:42.380163+00:00

Affected: termux proot-distro

proot-distro is a utility for managing proot containers. Prior to version 5.1.6, proot-distro restore accepted hardlink entries whose linkname referenced another installed container and did not verify that the hardlink source container matched the destination container being restored, allowing a crafted restore archive to copy files between otherwise isolated containers. This issue is fixed in version 5.1.6.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7h3g-4w2f-fj2f GHSA-7h3g-4w2f-fj2f — proot-distro has a Container Isolation Bypass via Crafted Restore Archive 2026-10-03T03:28:42.380237+00:00

Affected: PyPI: proot-distro

## Affected Component

- **Package:** proot-distro - **Affected command:** `restore` - **Attack surface:** Host-side Termux CLI processing a user-supplied backup archive - **Vulnerability type:** Container Isolation Bypass / Cross-Container Read and Write

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## Affected Versions

| Component | Version | |---|---| | proot-distro | 5.1.5 (confirmed affected) | | Test distro | Alpine Linux | | Architecture | aarch64 | | Device | Samsung Galaxy A23 | | Package source | https://packages-cf.termux.dev/apt/termux-main stable/main aarch64 |

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## Summary

When restoring a crafted backup archive, `proot-distro restore` accepts hardlink entries whose source path references a different installed container.

The restore logic resolves the hardlink source from the archive's `linkname` field and copies the referenced file into the container identified by the archive entry.

Although path traversal protections correctly keep the source path inside the proot-distro containers directory, no validation ensures that the hardlink source container matches the destination container.

As a result, a malicious backup archive can copy files between otherwise isolated containers, enabling both cross-container disclosure and cross-container file injection.

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## Proof of Concept #1 — Cross-Container File Disclosure

All testing was performed using self-owned containers and harmless marker data only.

### Step 1 — Create a victim container and marker file

```bash proot-distro install alpine -…