Affected: open-webui

Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. From 0.9.0 before 0.10.0 with Redis configured, Socket.IO connect, user-join, join-channels, join-note, and the terminal websocket first-message authentication used decode_token without the Redis-backed is_valid_token revocation check, allowing revoked JWTs to continue authenticating realtime connections. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.0.

Affected: PyPI: open-webui

## Summary

With Redis configured, Open WebUI supports JWT revocation: `POST /api/v1/auths/signout` (per-token `jti`) and OIDC back-channel logout (per-user `revoked_at`) record revocations in Redis, and HTTP auth (`get_current_user`) rejects revoked tokens with 401. The realtime authentication surfaces do not perform this check: Socket.IO connect / user-join / join-channels / join-note and the terminal websocket first-message auth validate tokens with `decode_token()` only (signature + expiry). A JWT revoked by sign-out or back-channel logout therefore continues to authenticate new realtime connections, even though the same token is rejected on HTTP.

## Affected component

- `backend/open_webui/socket/main.py` — Socket.IO `connect`, `user-join`, `join-channels`, `join-note` - `backend/open_webui/routers/terminals.py` — terminal websocket first-message auth - `backend/open_webui/utils/auth.py` — the revocation check was applied to HTTP only

## Root cause

HTTP auth enforces revocation:

```python # utils/auth.py — get_current_user if data.get('jti') and not await is_valid_token(request, data): raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail='Invalid token') ```

Realtime auth calls `decode_token()` only, which verifies signature + expiry but never consults the Redis revocation keys (`{prefix}:auth:token:{jti}:revoked`, `{prefix}:auth:user:{id}:revoked_at`):

```python # socket/main.py — connect / user-join / join-channels / join-note data = decode_token(auth['token']) # ro…