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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-10T15:20:34.598753+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-59217</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-59217 — Open WebUI: Upload `metadata.knowledge_id` bypasses the knowledge-base write-access check (read-only users can add file…</title>
    <updated>2026-10-10T15:20:34.600511+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> open-webui</p>
<p>Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. Prior to 0.10.0, the file upload path accepted metadata.knowledge_id and auto-linked uploaded files to a target knowledge base without applying the write-access check used by /api/v1/knowledge//file/add, allowing read-only knowledge-base users to add arbitrary files. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.0.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-59217"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7r7x-gjvr-448g</id>
    <title>GHSA-7r7x-gjvr-448g — Open WebUI: Upload `metadata.knowledge_id` bypasses the knowledge-base write-access check (read-only users can add file…</title>
    <updated>2026-10-10T15:20:34.600567+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: open-webui</p>
<p># Open WebUI upload metadata can add files to knowledge bases without write permission</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>Open WebUI's file upload background processing trusts the client-supplied `metadata.knowledge_id` value and inserts a `knowledge_file` association before validating that the uploading user has write access to the target knowledge base.</p>
<p>A verified user with only read access to a knowledge base can upload an arbitrary file and set `metadata={"knowledge_id":"&lt;target knowledge id&gt;"}`. The normal `/api/v1/knowledge/{id}/file/add` endpoint correctly requires knowledge-base write access, but the upload auto-link path bypasses that authorization check.</p>
<p>The immediate result is unauthorized modification of the target knowledge base's file membership. The attached attacker-controlled file becomes visible through `/api/v1/knowledge/{id}/files`, and readers/owners of that knowledge base can retrieve the file through the normal file endpoints because file access is derived from `KnowledgeFile` membership.</p>
<p>## Affected Version</p>
<p>- Repository: `open-webui/open-webui`
- Tested source commit: `02dc3e689ceac915a870b373318b99c029ddf603`
- Package version observed in `package.json`: `0.9.6`
- Package name: `open-webui`</p>
<p>## Impact</p>
<p>A read-only knowledge-base collaborator can perform a write operation against that knowledge base by attaching arbitrary uploaded files.</p>
<p>Security impact:</p>
<p>- Unauthorized knowledge-base membership modification.
- Integrity impact on shared knowledge-base file listings.…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7r7x-gjvr-448g"/>
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