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  <updated>2026-10-06T06:18:40.702214+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-54447</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-54447 — garminconnect: Insecure Permission Assignment for Garmin OAuth Token Store</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T06:18:40.703996+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> cyberjunky python-garminconnect</p>
<p>garminconnect is a Python 3 API wrapper for Garmin Connect that retrieves statistics and manages activities. Prior to 0.3.5, garminconnect/client.py Client.dump creates the OAuth token directory and garmin_tokens.json without explicit owner-only modes, so a permissive umask such as 022 can leave the directory mode at 0755 and the token file mode at 0644. garmin_tokens.json contains di_refresh_token, and another unprivileged user on a shared Linux or macOS host can read the token and obtain persistent access to the victim's Garmin Connect account, including health, fitness, activity, and device data. The Garmin.login tokenstore path is affected, and a pre-existing loosely permissioned token file remains exposed until rewritten or manually restricted. This issue is fixed in version 0.3.5.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-54447"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wjhr-76vg-2hvc</id>
    <title>GHSA-wjhr-76vg-2hvc — garminconnect Has Insecure Permission Assignment for Garmin OAuth Token Store</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T06:18:40.704053+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: garminconnect</p>
<p>## Insecure Permission Assignment for Garmin OAuth Token Store</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>`garminconnect` (≤ 0.3.4) wrote its OAuth token store to disk without restricting file-system permissions. Under the default Linux umask (`022`) the token file `garmin_tokens.json` was created world-readable (`0o644`). The file contains the DI **refresh token**, so any other local user on a shared host could read it and obtain persistent, unauthorized access to the victim's Garmin Connect account.</p>
<p>- **Severity:** High
- **Weakness:** CWE-732 (Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource)
- **Affected versions:** `&lt;= 0.3.4`
- **Patched version:** `0.3.5`</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>`Client.dump()` created the token directory and file with no `mode` argument, leaving permissions entirely to the process umask:</p>
<p>```python
def dump(self, path: str) -&gt; None:
    p = Path(path).expanduser()
    if p.is_dir() or not p.name.endswith(".json"):
        p = p / "garmin_tokens.json"
    p.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)   # no mode=
    p.write_text(self.dumps())                     # no permission restriction
```</p>
<p>The serialized payload includes `di_token`, `di_refresh_token`, and `di_client_id`. The call is in the core library (`Garmin.login(tokenstore=...)` persists tokens this way), and all shipped usage examples default the token store to `~/.garminconnect`.</p>
<p>Under `umask 022` the resulting permissions were:</p>
<p>- token directory → `0o755`
- `garmin_tokens.json` → `0o644` (world-readable)</p>
<p>A separate, un…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wjhr-76vg-2hvc"/>
  </entry>
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