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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-10T03:00:36.368646+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org" rel="alternate"/>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-47411</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-47411 — praisonai-platform: Any workspace member can rewrite workspace name, description, and settings via PATCH /workspaces/{i…</title>
    <updated>2026-10-10T03:00:36.370455+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> MervinPraison praisonai-platform</p>
<p>PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an authorization bypass enabling workspace metadata + settings tampering. The `PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role="member"`). Any member can rewrite the workspace's `name`, `description`, and the `settings` JSON blob. The settings field is a free-form JSON object — depending on which downstream code reads it, this becomes a configuration-injection primitive for any setting the platform exposes there. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-47411"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rcmc-q9rj-4wmq</id>
    <title>GHSA-rcmc-q9rj-4wmq — praisonai-platform: Any workspace member can rewrite workspace name, description, and settings via PATCH /workspaces/{i…</title>
    <updated>2026-10-10T03:00:36.370517+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonai-platform</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>**Type:** Authorization bypass enabling workspace metadata + settings tampering. The `PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role="member"`). Any member can rewrite the workspace's `name`, `description`, and the `settings` JSON blob. The settings field is a free-form JSON object — depending on which downstream code reads it, this becomes a configuration-injection primitive for any setting the platform exposes there.
**File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 63-74; `services/workspace_service.py`'s `update()` method.
**Root cause:** `Depends(require_workspace_member)` resolves to default `min_role="member"`. `WorkspaceService.update(workspace_id, name, description, settings)` writes the new fields to the workspace row without any caller-permission check. The role hierarchy (`MemberService.has_role`) is never consulted.</p>
<p>## Affected Code</p>
<p>**File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 63-74.</p>
<p>```python
@router.patch("/{workspace_id}", response_model=WorkspaceResponse)
async def update_workspace(
    workspace_id: str,
    body: WorkspaceUpdate,
    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),         # &lt;-- BUG: defaults to min_role="member"
    session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
    ws_svc = WorkspaceService(session)
    ws = await ws_svc.update(workspace_id, body.name, body.description, b…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rcmc-q9rj-4wmq"/>
  </entry>
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