https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-12T22:15:29.654948+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-47394 CVE-2026-47394 — PraisonAI vulnerable to unauthenticated arbitrary file read via MCP workflow.show, workflow.validate, deploy.validate 2026-10-12T22:15:29.656580+00:00

Affected: MervinPraison PraisonAI

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.6.40, the fix for GHSA-9mqq-jqxf-grvw / CVE-2026-44336 is incomplete. The original advisory description named four vulnerable handlers in `mcp_server/adapters/cli_tools.py`. Commit `68cc9427` ("fix(security): harden MCP rules path handling…") added a `_resolve_rule_path()` helper and applied it to `rules.create`, `rules.show`, and `rules.delete`. `workflow.show` was left unchanged. Two adjacent handlers in the same file have the same pattern, `workflow.validate` and `deploy.validate`. Neither was mentioned in the original advisory. Both remained unchanged. The original advisory also identified the dispatcher (`server.py:281-298`) as a root cause. It accepts unvalidated `**kwargs` from `params["arguments"]` with no enforcement against the tool's declared `input_schema`. That code is unchanged prior to version 4.6.40. A single unauthenticated MCP `tools/call` to `praisonai.workflow.show` returns the contents of any file the host user can read: `/etc/passwd`, `~/.ssh/id_rsa`, `~/.aws/credentials`, or any project `.env`. Version 4.6.40 contains an updated fix.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-9cr9-25q5-8prj GHSA-9cr9-25q5-8prj — PraisonAI vulnerable to unauthenticated arbitrary file read via MCP workflow.show, workflow.validate, deploy.validate 2026-10-12T22:15:29.656637+00:00

Affected: PyPI: PraisonAI

## Summary

The fix for GHSA-9mqq-jqxf-grvw / CVE-2026-44336 is incomplete. The original advisory description named four vulnerable handlers in `mcp_server/adapters/cli_tools.py`:

> "registers four file-handling tools by default, `praisonai.rules.create`, `praisonai.rules.show`, `praisonai.rules.delete`, **and `praisonai.workflow.show`**. Each accepts a path or filename string from MCP `tools/call` arguments… **with no containment check**."

Commit `68cc9427` ("fix(security): harden MCP rules path handling…") added a `_resolve_rule_path()` helper and applied it to `rules.create`, `rules.show`, and `rules.delete`. `workflow.show` was left unchanged. Two adjacent handlers in the same file have the same pattern, `workflow.validate` and `deploy.validate`. Neither was mentioned in the original advisory. Both remain unchanged.

The original advisory also identified the dispatcher (`server.py:281-298`) as a root cause. It accepts unvalidated `**kwargs` from `params["arguments"]` with no enforcement against the tool's declared `input_schema`. That code is unchanged in HEAD as of commit `42221210`.

**Result**: A single unauthenticated MCP `tools/call` to `praisonai.workflow.show` returns the contents of any file the host user can read: `/etc/passwd`, `~/.ssh/id_rsa`, `~/.aws/credentials`, or any project `.env`.

## Affected functionality

`src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/adapters/cli_tools.py`:

| Lines | Tool | Bug | |-------|------|-----| | 63-73 | `praisonai.workflow.show` |…