https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-12T09:53:32.215613+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-45401 CVE-2026-45401 — Open WebUI: SSRF Bypass via HTTP Redirect Following in Web-Fetch and Image-Load Endpoints 2026-10-12T09:53:32.258228+00:00

Affected: open-webui

Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.5, the validate_url() function in backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py only validates the initial URL submitted by the caller. The HTTP clients used downstream (sync requests, async aiohttp, langchain's WebBaseLoader) follow HTTP 3xx redirects by default and do not re-validate the redirect target against the private-IP / metadata-IP block list. Any authenticated user can therefore submit a public URL that 302-redirects to an internal address (e.g. 127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254, RFC1918) and read the internal response body via the /api/v1/retrieval/process/web endpoint, the /api/v1/images/... endpoints, the /api/chat/completions endpoint with an image_url content part, and any other route that calls these helpers. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.5.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rh5x-h6pp-cjj6 GHSA-rh5x-h6pp-cjj6 — Open WebUI has a SSRF Bypass via HTTP Redirect Following in Web-Fetch and Image-Load Endpoints (not addressed by CVE-20… 2026-10-12T09:53:32.258286+00:00

Affected: PyPI: open-webui

# Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) Bypass via HTTP Redirect Following in Web-Fetch, Image-Load, and Chat-Completion Endpoints

## Summary

The `validate_url()` function in `backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py` only validates the *initial* URL submitted by the caller. The HTTP clients used downstream (sync `requests`, async `aiohttp`, langchain's `WebBaseLoader`) follow HTTP 3xx redirects by default and do **not** re-validate the redirect target against the private-IP / metadata-IP block list. Any authenticated user can therefore submit a public URL that 302-redirects to an internal address (e.g. `127.0.0.1`, `169.254.169.254`, RFC1918) and read the internal response body via the `/api/v1/retrieval/process/web` endpoint, the `/api/v1/images/...` endpoints, the `/api/chat/completions` endpoint with an `image_url` content part, and any other route that calls these helpers.

## Affected code paths

The bypass exists across multiple call sites; each independently follows redirects without re-validation.

### Path 1 — sync `_scrape` via `SafeWebBaseLoader`

`backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py` — `SafeWebBaseLoader` inherits from `langchain_community.document_loaders.WebBaseLoader`. The parent's `_scrape()` calls `self.session.get(url, **self.requests_kwargs)`. `requests_kwargs` only sets `timeout`; `allow_redirects=False` is **not** passed, so `requests.Session.get()` follows redirects with the default `allow_redirects=True`. `validate_url()` is invoked once on the…