Affected: motioneye-project motioneye

motionEye (mEye) is an online interface for motion software, a video surveillance program with motion detection. Versions prior to 0.44.0 create the configuration file /etc/motioneye/motion.conf with 644 permissions (-rw-r--r--), making it readable by any local user on the system. This file contains sensitive data including the admin password hash, which can be leveraged by other vulnerabilities to escalate privileges. Additionally, per-camera configuration files (camera-*.conf) are also created with the same 644 permissions, potentially exposing camera-specific credentials and settings. The exposed SHA1 admin password hash can be cracked offline to recover the plaintext password, used directly to forge authenticated admin API requests via the signature authentication weakness (GHSA-45h7-499j-7ww3), and chained with the OS command injection flaw (CVE-2025-60787) to escalate a local unprivileged user to the Motion daemon user (often root), enabling full system compromise. This issue has been fixed in version 0.44.0.

Affected: PyPI: motioneye

# Security Advisory: World-Readable Configuration File Exposes Admin Password Hash in motionEye

## Summary

motionEye v0.43.1 and prior versions create the configuration file `/etc/motioneye/motion.conf` with `644` permissions (`-rw-r--r--`), making it readable by any local user on the system. This file contains sensitive data including the admin password hash, which can be leveraged by other vulnerabilities to escalate privileges.

## Affected Versions

- motionEye <= 0.43.1b4 - Fixed in motionEye 0.44.0b1 (applies `0600` mode to `motion.conf` and `camera-*.conf` files)

## Vulnerability Details

### World-Readable Configuration File (CWE-732)

When motionEye writes its configuration, the file `/etc/motioneye/motion.conf` is created with `644` permissions regardless of the installation method. This file contains the admin password hash in the `@admin_password` field:

``` # @admin_username admin # @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37 ```

Any local user can read this hash without elevated privileges:

```bash $ sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf # @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37 ```

Additionally, per-camera configuration files (`camera-*.conf`) are also created with the same `644` permissions, potentially exposing camera-specific credentials and settings.

## Impact

The exposed admin password hash enables several attack paths:

- **Offline password cracking:** The SHA1 hash can be cracked to recover the plaintext…