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  <updated>2026-10-02T14:01:24.797513+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-50181</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-50181 — Langroid: Path traversal in the file tools allows read/write outside configured current directory</title>
    <updated>2026-10-02T14:01:24.799155+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> langroid</p>
<p>Langroid is a framework for building large-language-model-powered applications. Prior to version 0.64.0, Langroid's `ReadFileTool` and `WriteFileTool` appear to treat `curr_dir` as the intended working-directory boundary for file operations. However, the tools only change the process working directory to `curr_dir` and then operate on the user-supplied `file_path` without resolving and enforcing that the final path remains inside `curr_dir`. As a result, a tool caller can supply path traversal sequences such as `../secret.txt` to read files outside the configured current directory, or `../written_by_tool.txt` to write files outside that directory. This can impact applications that expose Langroid file tools to an LLM agent, user-controlled tool call, or delegated coding/documentation agent while relying on `curr_dir` to restrict file access to a project/workspace directory. Version 0.64.0 patches the issue.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-50181"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-fg23-3346-88f5</id>
    <title>GHSA-fg23-3346-88f5 — Langroid: Path traversal in the file tools allows read/write outside configured current directory</title>
    <updated>2026-10-02T14:01:24.799210+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: langroid</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>Langroid's `ReadFileTool` and `WriteFileTool` appear to treat `curr_dir` as the intended working-directory boundary for file operations. However, the tools only change the process working directory to `curr_dir` and then operate on the user-supplied `file_path` without resolving and enforcing that the final path remains inside `curr_dir`.</p>
<p>As a result, a tool caller can supply path traversal sequences such as `../secret.txt` to read files outside the configured current directory, or `../written_by_tool.txt` to write files outside that directory.</p>
<p>This can impact applications that expose Langroid file tools to an LLM agent, user-controlled tool call, or delegated coding/documentation agent while relying on `curr_dir` to restrict file access to a project/workspace directory.</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>Affected components:</p>
<p>- `langroid/agent/tools/file_tools.py`
- `langroid/utils/system.py`</p>
<p>Relevant behavior observed:</p>
<p>`ReadFileTool` contains a comment indicating the intended assumption:</p>
<p>```text
# ASSUME: file_path should be relative to the curr_dir</p>
<p>The tool then changes into the configured current directory and calls read_file(self.file_path).</p>
<p>WriteFileTool similarly resolves curr_dir, changes into that directory, and calls create_file(self.file_path, self.content).</p>
<p>The issue is that changing the process working directory does not prevent traversal. A path such as ../secret.txt is still valid and resolves outside the configured curr_dir.</p>
<p>In local testing, ReadFileTool su…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-fg23-3346-88f5"/>
  </entry>
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