Affected: Google Keras, Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI)

Arbitrary file read in the model loading mechanism (HDF5 integration) in Keras versions 3.0.0 through 3.13.1 on all supported platforms allows a remote attacker to read local files and disclose sensitive information via a crafted .keras model file utilizing HDF5 external dataset references.

Affected: PyPI: keras

## Summary

TensorFlow / Keras continues to honor HDF5 “external storage” and `ExternalLink` features when loading weights. A malicious `.weights.h5` (or a `.keras` archive embedding such weights) can direct `load_weights()` to read from an arbitrary readable filesystem path. The bytes pulled from that path populate model tensors and become observable through inference or subsequent re-save operations. Keras “safe mode” only guards object deserialization and does not cover weight I/O, so this behaviour persists even with safe mode enabled. The issue is confirmed on the latest publicly released stack (`tensorflow 2.20.0`, `keras 3.11.3`, `h5py 3.15.1`, `numpy 2.3.4`).

## Impact

- **Class**: CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Information), CWE-73 (External Control of File Name or Path) - **What leaks**: Contents of any readable file on the host (e.g., `/etc/hosts`, `/etc/passwd`, `/etc/hostname`). - **Visibility**: Secrets appear in model outputs (e.g., Dense layer bias) or get embedded into newly saved artifacts. - **Prerequisites**: Victim executes `model.load_weights()` or `tf.keras.models.load_model()` on an attacker-supplied HDF5 weights file or `.keras` archive. - **Scope**: Applies to modern Keras (3.x) and TensorFlow 2.x lines; legacy HDF5 paths remain susceptible.

## Attacker Scenario

1. **Initial foothold**: The attacker convinces a user (or CI automation) to consume a weight artifact—perhaps by publishing a pre-trained model, contributing to an open-source repositor…