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  <updated>2026-10-04T15:17:02.070747+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-44889</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-44889 — WebOb: Location header normalization during redirect leads to open redirect</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T15:17:02.101876+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Pylons webob</p>
<p>WebOb provides objects for HTTP requests and responses. Prior to 1.8.10, the normalization of the HTTP Location header during a redirect is vulnerable to an open redirect: WebOb joins the redirect target to the request URI using Python's urljoin, and since Python 3.10 the underlying urlsplit strips ASCII tab, carriage return, and newline characters before parsing, so a redirect target containing such characters can be reinterpreted as a protocol-relative URL whose authority is an attacker-controlled host. This bypasses the CVE-2024-42353 fix that escaped a leading double slash, allowing an attacker who influences the redirect location to send users to an arbitrary external site instead of the intended one. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.8.10.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-44889"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-fh3h-vg37-cc95</id>
    <title>GHSA-fh3h-vg37-cc95 — WebOb: Location header normalization during redirect leads to open redirect - again</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T15:17:02.101944+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: webob</p>
<p>### Impact</p>
<p>When WebOb normalizes the HTTP Location header to include the request hostname, it does so by parsing the URL that the user is to be redirected to with Python's `urllib.parse`, and joining it to the base URL. `urlsplit` (called internally by `urljoin`) however treats a `//` at the start of a string as a URI without a scheme, and then treats the next part as the hostname. `urljoin` will then use that hostname from the second part as the hostname replacing the original one from the request.</p>
<p>In a previous advisory https://github.com/Pylons/webob/security/advisories/GHSA-mg3v-6m49-jhp3 an attempt to fix this was made by forcing the replacement of `//` with `/%2f`, however this did not take into account that since Python 3.10 `urlsplit` internally strips ASCII tab, carriage return, and newline characters from the string, so `/\t/attacker.com` gets turned into `//attacker.com` and the attacker is able to bypass the changes introduced in that previous advisory, thereby bringing back the problem that was attempted to be fixed.</p>
<p>```
&gt;&gt;&gt; parse.urlparse("//attacker.com/some/path")
ParseResult(scheme='', netloc='attacker.com', path='/some/path', params='', query='', fragment='')
```</p>
<p>WebOb uses `urljoin` to take the request URI and join the redirect location to it, so assuming the request URI is `https://example.org/` and the URL to redirect to is `/\t/attacker.com/some/path/`:</p>
<p>```
&gt;&gt;&gt; parse.urljoin("https://example.org/", "/\t/attacker.com/some/path/")
'https://attacker.c…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-fh3h-vg37-cc95"/>
  </entry>
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